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Ali ABSTRACT 01' TBB ftBS1S OF Bert. Lewis JUIlior Parrar for 
the Master of Arb in History pre••at.ed April 14, 1971. 
TlUel 	 Poreign Policy Deei.lou Which Led to Uaitad State. 
Milit.ary Occupation of the DoaUnican Republie. 
APPROVED BY MBMBBRS 01' THE TBBSIS COMMlftBB I 
Preclerick NUDA, CbalrJ1lall 
'1'0 achi... in4epen4ence, the Doa.inican Republic 
had 1:0 tint endure three centw:1ea of haavy-hancled SpaD­
iah rule and. period. of Haitian domination that. laated 
for twenty-two yean. !'ear of Haitian reconque8t., how...r, 
conviDce4 the leacting Doaaiaican politicians that the new 
aatiOD could not 10n9 endure without forelta protection. 
Bncouraged by Domia1can offers of a naval ba•• , the 
UDited State. t:oyed with tthe 14ea of expansion in the Car­
ibbean aa early .. 1850, but civil war cut short the•• 
notions aDd allowed Spain t.o r .....rt control o".r her 
former colony. Although Spanisb occupation ended in fail­
ure the UDited Snua bea_ lIOn de~.ndD8d that the 
i.lud Republic should never avain be dominated by • Eur­
opean power. 
Such • determination on the part of tbe United Statee 
to pre'91lDt. European incursion led to an abortlve annexa­
t.ionist: at.teJlpt. by the Grant ac:'blini.t.ratloll in 1869 _d to 
the ••t.abl:1.ahJlent. of a cuto.. noeiverehip ln 1905, when 
UDpa:l.4 foreign debt. &rouse4 t:ha ire of European creditx>r•• 
It w.. hoped that the eatabliahment. of & austo.. 
receivership would usber 1n a per10d of peace ud pros­
perl ty for the Dominicans, but. by 1'12 :1.t beo_ a,,:1.dent 
that. .uch hope. were not. t.o be r.a11.a4. ,resldent. Wilson 
adbe..d to the argument that. forelgn intervention in the 
Caribbean wa. not 1:0 be tolerated but. broadened Oni ted 
State. inYolvement in the domestio policies of the Domini­
can RepUblic by in.istinq OD the establishment of • con­
stitut.ional deJBOCrac:y, whlah he f.lt would .s~li.h d~ 
tic uaaqu11ity. Wben it beaa.e appareat that the iDte.rnal 
eoa41t1ona of the ialaad. Republic were Dot improvin9, 
W11soD nluccant.ly ordered in the Unlt.ed 8t.at... Marine. 
1D the hope. that. they would be able t.o educat.e the Doalin­
iean. t:o the way. of dellOCracy. 
By broadanil'l, the scope of tlDited State. involve· 
aent ia the do.stio aftair. of t.he DofIliaioaD .Republic, 
wilBon bad produoed an occupation that denied the Domini­
cans the inherent right of a nation to gOY8rn itself, a 
liberty whioh bad been maintained a,ainst overwhelming 
odds durinq the preceding seventy-two years. 
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AN INTRODUCTORY POLITICAL HISTORY 
The island of Hispaniola was discovered in 1492 by 
Christopher Columbus who took possession in the name of the 
King and Queen of Spain. From this date forth the island 
was to be a victim of outside forces. For over half a cen­
tury the island was the capital of the Spanish empire in the 
Americas. with the discovery of gold and silver in Mexico 
and Peru, however, her importance dwindled rapidly in the 
eyea of the Spanish Crown. By 1650 she had become an abused 
power in Spain's wars with France and England and in 1697 
the western portion of the island was formally ceded to 
France. 
Left to pursue her course in relative peace the Span­
ish colony of Santo Domingo experienced a brief cultural 
and economic revival by the middle of the eighteenth century. 
By the end of the century, however, she found herself emersed 
in the turmoil of the Haitian revolution and endured mili­
tary occupations by the three great colonial powers of Spain, 
France, and England. 
In 1821 a conspiracy led by JOS' Nunez de c~ceres 
expelled the Spanish authority and Santo Domingo waa declared 
independent. Within a matter of weeks, however, President 
Jean Pierre Boyer of Haiti declared the people of Santo 
Domingo to be subject to the lawa of Haiti and occupied the 
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country with troops. Opposition steadily mounted and in 
1844 the Haitian yoke was overturned and the Dominican 
Republic was established. 
From 1844 to the end of the century three men domin­
ated Dominican history. They were Pedro Santana, Buena­
/ventura B4ez, and Uli8.8 Beureaux. Both Santana and Baez 
feared Haitian reconquest and sought the assistance of 
foreign powers in helping to maintain the Republic's inde­
pendence from Haiti. Tbe pursuit of such policies led to 
the re-establishment of Spanish control frOll. 1861 to 1865 
and aroused a greater determination by the United States 
that the tiny Republic should never aqain be dominated by a 
foreign power. This attitude in turn produced an abortive 
annexationist attempt by the Grant administration in 1869. 
During the 1870's the tiny Republic reeled under a 
aeries of revolts. Not until 1882 was political stability 
established under the rule of Ulises Heureaux. His seven­
teen years of dictatorial rule were cbaracterized by a sup­
pression of Constitutional liberties and the accumulation 
of a foreign debt that approximated thirty-two million 
dollars by the time of bis assassination in 1899. Chaos 
followed Heureaux' death and the country went still deeper 
in debt. In order to stave off the pos8ibili~y of a 
European intervention designed to collect money due their 
nationals, the United States government, on the request of 
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Dominican President Carlos P. Morales, took over the col­
lection of import duties throughout the Republic. 
Under President RamOn C~ceres (1906-1911) prOgress 
was made towares the liquidation of the foreign debt, poli­
tical stability prevailed, constitutional reforms were 
introduced and the economy began to prosper. In 1911, how­
/ 
ever, Caceres was assassinated and chaos returned. In 1914 
the united States government intervened to insure an honest 
election and tried to persuade the new president, Juan 
Isidro Ji~nez, to accept certain economic and political 
I
reforms. When Jimenez was ousted by a revolution in 1916 
President Wilson sent in United States Marines to occupy 
the country. Although well intentioned, the occupation, 
which lasted until 1924, was ill received by the Dominicans 
who wanted freedom rather than reforms in education, sani­
tation and public works. 
CHAPTER I 
THE ANNEXATIONIST fEARS 
In 1821, inspired by the efforts of SimOn Bol~var, 
Dominicans succeeded in gaining their freedom from Spain. 
Within a few short weeks, however, they were conquered by 
neighboring Haiti who asserted her authority over them until 
1844. From the outset the Republic's second period of 
independence was marked by political violence and insurrec­
tion. Added to her misery was the fact that from time to 
time the Haitians attempted to restore their authority by 
force. Living in constant fear of Haitian invasion Domini­
can politicians appealed abroad to the United States, France, 
Spain, and Great 8ritain for protection. While the United 
States was engaged in Civil War Spain reannexed her former 
colony only to withdraw in 1865 because of high occupation 
costa and the decimation of her army by native upriSings 
and yellow fever. Though ahort-lived, Spanish intrusion 
aroused a greater determination by the United States that 
the Dominican Republic should never again be dominated by 
a foreign power. Washington's interest in repeated Domini­
can offers of a treaty providing for annexation of the 
Dominican Republic to the United States was spurred also 
by the fact that the fine harbor at SamanA Bay was poten­
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tially one of the most strategic positions in the West 
Indies. 
North American relations with the island of Hispan­
iola commenced in the first decades of the eighteenth 
century when Yankee skippers ventured forth into the Carib­
bean Sea in search of trade. This inter-imperial trade, 
made possible by the abundant productivity of the British 
colonies in America, was of course, illegal, but • 
••• so strong were these trading instincts and 
so rich were the rewards from this illicit com­
merce that differences of race, religion, and 
nationality were lightly regarded. Even the 
many wars that vexed old Europe failed to destroy 
these colonial connections. l 
With the waning of Spanish power in the seventeenth 
century, the Prench contrived to gain a foothold in the 
western extremity of Hispaniola, efforts made by Spain to 
dislodge them proved futile, and by the ~reaty of Ryswick 
in 1697 the western third of the island was formally ceded 
to Prance. Through the efforts of the French planters, the 
colony of Saint-Domingue, as it was called, became one of 
the most fertile and productive regions in the New World, 
and the most precious overseas possession of France. Here 
was centered a rich plantation ~conomy which provided sugar 
and coffee for European tables but which lacked a supply of 
salt meat, salt fish, and flour to feed the thousands of 
lCharles Callan Tansill, The united States and Santo 
Dominio, 1798-18731 A Chaeter In caribbean DIplomacy (Bal­
tImorel 30hn Hopilns Jress, 1938), p. 1. 
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Negro alaves who cultivated the valuable crops. France 
could not furnish the thriving colony with enough cheap 
meat, but the British North American colonist. could. Soon 
Yankee traders were supplying the French planters with fish, 
salt meat, live.tock, flour, rice and other provisions in 
return for sugar and molas8es. French attempts to impose 
limitations on the trade repeatedly met with failure. The 
importance of this lucrative trade was stated by John Adams 
in 1783 when he declared that wso essential is this commerce 
to both parties that if the governments forbid it, it will 
be carried on clandestinely.w2 
In the first weeks of August 1791, aeveral Negro 
leaders formulated plans for overthrowing the hated slave 
owners of Haiti. By September the revolt had spread through­
out the colony. The United States government at first 
-extended assistance to the colonial administration in Haiti 
through payments upon the national debt owed to France,w3 
but the whites, outnumbered eleven to one, were slaughtered 
in large numbers and were gradually forced from the island. 
After a series of costly wars the Neqro leader Tous­
saint l'Overture led the blacks to victory in Haiti and by 
1801 secured control over the whole of Hispaniola. His suc­
cesa, however, was only temporary. Napoleon, free from 
2The Works of John Adams, ed. by C.F. Adams (10 vols" 
Boston, 1854), vttI, p. 79, quoted in Tansill, 0e.cit., p.3. 
3Tansill, 0e.cit., p.8. 
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entanglement in Europe, immediately organized a military 
expedition, under General Victor La Clerc, to recover Santo 
Domingo. Toussaint was forc·ed to surrender, and was later 
captured and imprisoned in France where he died within a year. 
The Prench, however, presently faced a new series of revolts 
led by the capable Negrc commander, Jean Jacques Dessalines. 
The Prench position soon became a defensive one. By the end 
of 1802 yellow fever had ravaged the Prench army and killed 
its commander and wben the Peace of Amiens was broken by 
warfare in 1803 Napoleon decided he could ill afford to dis­
sipate his strength in quest of empire west of the Missis­
sippi. An astute Thomas Jefferson, realizing that without 
Hispaniola as a cornerstone the proposed French Empire in the 
West was at beat a shaky structure, sent James Monroe to aid 
the American Minister at Paris, Robert Livingston, in negoti­
ating a sale of the Plorida. and New Orleans. 
Napoleon, realizing failure in Hispaniola, and know­
ing full well that England might land an army in Louisiana 
and hold the territory by right of conquest, endeavored to 
win the good will of the United States, and thereby keep 
her from forming an alliance with England, by selling the 
Louisiana Territory in its entirety to the United States 
government for fifteen million dollars. 
The Prench were able to maintain themselves in Santo 
Domingo (the Spanish portion of the island) until 1809 
when a national insurrection, aided by Spanish and English 
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troops succeeded in expelling them forever. The people 
of Santo Domingo then accepted the rule of Spain until 1821 
when a Republic was proclaimed. Independence, however, 
lasted only the few weeks that it took the President of 
Haiti, Jean Pierre Boyer, to occupy the country. 
Haitian rule (1822-44) was a period of social and 
economic retrogression for Dominicans. Every effort was 
made to Haitianize the oountry by extending the Haitian 
laws, and imposing Haitian administrators and governors who 
ruled with an iron hand. Through the systematic use of 
terror Spanish families were forced from the island and 
their lands resettled by Haitians. The University of santo 
Domingo, one of the oldest in the western Hemisphere, was 
closed. With the expUlsion of all Spanish priests the clergy 
deteriorated and many ohurohes were left without priests. 
Misery was widespread and ·public spirit seems to have sunk 
so low that only rarely were any sporadic efforts made to 
raise the standard of a new rebellion.- 4 The following 
report SUbmitted to the British Parliament in 1826 by the 
British Consul-General in Haiti provides a graphic descrip­
tion of the effeots of Haitian rules 
The whole isle is divided into departments,

arrondissements, and communes. These are all 

under the command of military men subject only 

4Sumner Welles, Naboth's Vinetards the Dominican 
Re~ublic5 1844-1924 (2 vols., New orks Payson , Clarke 
Lt ., 19 8), I, pp. 51-2. 
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to the control of the President, and to them is 
entrusted exclusively. the execution of all laws 
whether affecting police, agriculture or finance. 
There is not a single civilian charged with an 
extensive authority • • • During the past two 
years trade has gradually fallen off and • • • it 
is supposed that it has decreased nearly one half 
• • • The moat important code is the Code Rural, 
the cbief cbaracter of wbicb i8 the enforcing of 
labor. It is a modification of the old Prench 
regulations sanctioned by the Code Noire, with 
additional restrictions. The provisions are as 
despotic as those of any slave system that can be 
conceived. The laborer may almost be considered 
aa -adacriptus glebe,- he is deemed a vagrant and 
liable to punishment if he ventures to move from 
his dwelling or farm without license. He is pro­
hibited from keeping a shop. No person can build 
a houae in the country not connected with a farm. 
• • • The Code affixes the penalty or fine in some 
cases, and there is indeflnite imprisonment at the 
option of the justice of the peace. CUltivation 
would not go on beyond that which daily neeesai­
ties might require, except for the Code. The 
degrease in population in thirty-three years has 
been very nearly one-third of the whole population
in 1793 ••• The Government has appropriated all 
the church property to ita own use. The clergy 
rely wholly on the feea, two-thirds of which they 
are obliged to pay into the Treasury. • • • It is 
not a subject of surprise that morality should be 
in as low a stage • • • Marriage is scarcely thought
of••••5 
Under Boyer, however, trade with the United States 
I 
once _+ain quickened so that by 1822 -the value of American 
export, [3:0 the island of Hispaniol!] was equivalent to the 
oomb!ntd expor~. to Ruaeia, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark aDd 
~From a report of Charles McKenzie, British Consul­
General in Haiti, submitted September 8, 1826, by the Rt. 
Hon. George Canning to Parliament, quoted in Welles, op.cit., 
I, pp. 52-3. 
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Ireland.-6 Although lucrative commercial relations bound 
the United States to Hispaniola, the government in Washing­
ton refused to establish a diplomatic post. The main reason 
diplomatic recognition of Boyer's government was not forth­
coming w.s because of the ticklish slavery question. Rep­
resentatives from the South ware particularly vehement in 
their denunciation of proposed Haitian recognition. Their 
position was well outlined by Senator Benton of Missouri in 
1826 when he stated that. 
We purchaae coffee from her, and pay for it, 
but we interchange no consuls or ministers. • • • 
And why? Becaus. the peace of eleven states will 
not permit the fruits of a successful negro insur­
rection to be exhibited among them. • • • It will 
not permit the fact to be seen, and told, that for 
the murder of their masters and mistresses, they 
are to find friends &mOng the white people of these 
United States.' 
It was not until 1844, the year in which the Dominican 
Republic gained its independence from Haiti, that the United 
states entered into official diplomatic relations with the 
island of Hispaniola. After abortive attempts at seeking 
European assistance, Dominican President Pedro Santana,8 
fearing an invasion attempt by General Charles H'rard of 
'Niles' Register, XX, p. 49, quoted in Tansill, ~ 
cit., p. 12(1.
-
'Belistar of Debates in CODjres., 19 Cong., 1 ses8., 
p. 330, quoted 1n 'anslii, op.c1£., p. 122. 
8Santana was president three times. His terms were as 
follows. November 13, l844-August 4, 1848, February 15, 
l853-May 26, 18561 January 31, l8S9-March 18, 1861. 
• • • 
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Haiti and wishing to establish a treaty of friendship and 
commerce, sent Dr. Jose~ M. Caminero a& special envoy to the 
United States to obtain recognition. Within six weeks' 
time Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, at the urging of 
President John Tyler, sent a special agent, John Hogan, to 
the Dominioan Republic to obtain information concerning 
the resources and internal conditions of the island. In 
Hogan's opinion the island was of -inestimable value- and 
had ·one of the most admirable positions which the world 
can exhibit for a commeroial emporium.-9 
The administration of James Polk, however, desired 
more information and in the spring of 1846 entrusted a fact 
finding mission to a young naval lieutenant, David D. Por­
ter. Porter's observations were critical in many respects. 
He recognized the presence of valuable mineral deposits and 
delighted at the harbor potentialities of Sam&n4 Bay but of 
the climate he remarked that -the air at night is filled 
with poisonous flies, and mosquitoes drive one alreost mad,­
while as to the constitution of the Republic he believed 
that for the present, -it might as well never have been adop­
ted, because of flagrant abuses of power.·10 
9&ogan to Buchanan, October 4, 1845, S;icial Agents 
Series, XIII, MS. Dept. of State, quoted ininsIII, op.cit., 
p. 121),. 
lODavid D. Porter, Journal of a Mission to Santo 
Domingo, 1846, quoted in TansIII, op.elf., p. 128. 
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With the outbreak of the Mexican War in May, 1846, the 
United States paid soant attention until 1849 to the affairs 
of the Dominioan Rapublio,with the result that the Domini­
oans, feeling slighted, turned to Europe for succor. By 
1849, however, the Dominicans, faoed with the threat of be­
ing conquered by President !'austin Soulouque of Haiti, once 
again pleaded with the United States government for a promise 
of protection or annexation. During this time an American 
observer described Santo Domingo as a oity wherel 
Consternation and alarm prevail. The President 
of Haiti, Soulouque, is within two days- march of 
this city with 10,000 blacks. He declares exter­
mination to all whites and mulattoes and has beaten 
the people of this Republic in every battle. My 
house is already filled with frightened females • 
• • • The Haitian army is almost upon us. Almost 
all of the foremost merchants have packed up their 
godd. and shipped them to the neighboring islands 
before leaving with their families. The town is 
filled with women and children from the country
and famine ia to be apprehended. • • • The Pres­
ident has told me that it is his intention to set 
fire to the place in Itse they cannot hold out 
against the Haitians. 
The American minister, Benjamin Green, while sympathetic to 
Dominican overtures, was forced to remain noncommittal, 
whereupon, -the Dominican government, on February 22, 1850, 
addressed identical notes to the representatives of the 
United Statea, Prance, and England, requesting joint inter­
llElliott to Buchanan, April 13, 1849, and April 24, 
1849, quoted in Welles, op.cit., I, pp. 89-90. 
13 

vention and mediation. e12 
When Millard Fillmore beoame President as a result of 
President Zachary Taylor's sudden death in July 1850, he 
immediately appointed Daniel Webster to replaoe John M. 
Clayton as Secretary of State. Seoretary Webster's sympa­
thies were strongly enlisted on the side of the Dominioans 
and he deci4ed early that ethe only effective method for 
maintaining the stability of the Dominican Government lay 
in joining Prance and England in a joint mediation.-13 Web­
ster's nomination resulted in Robert M. Walsh's elevation 
as special agent to Santo Domingo and Haiti replacing Ben­
jamin Gnen. Mr. Walsh set sail for Hispaniola on January 
25, 1851 and upon arriving proceeded immediately to Port au 
Prince where he presented his credentials to the British and 
Prench oonsuls. In Webster's decision to join France and 
Britain in mediation to bring peace to the tiny republic he 
had instructed Walsh to resist any aotions whioh might 
-trench upon the just rights of the Dominicans.-14 While 
willing to jointly mediate the Dominican crisis, Washington 
atill-Iooked with disfavor upon European intervention in the 
12Tansill, op.cit., p. 136. 

13welle8, op.cit., I, p. 112. 

14Webster to Walsh, January 18, 1851, quoted in Welles, 

op.oit.:, I, p. 113. 
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Western Hemisphere.·1S 
After presenting his credentials Mr. Walsh informed 
the Haitian Minister of Foreign Affairs that the govern­
ment of the United States had decided to cooperate with the 
governments of England and Prance to secure Dominican sov­
ereignty and that. 
Any further-prosecution of the war, therefore, 
ia abhorrent to the dictates of humanity and reason 
and injurious to the interests of neutrals. • • • 
Tbe principle ia now fully established that the 
actual possession of independence for a reasonable 
time entitles a nation to be acknowledged as sov­
ereign. This is a principle which the American 
world established as consecrated and muat ever be 
upheld • • • The best intereats of the Haitian 
Empire demand the recognition of Dominican indepen­
dence ••• In every point of view, therefore, the 
Government of the United States entertains the 
conviction that it is incumbent upon the Emperor 
[iaustinli' to recognize the independence of Santo 
Domingo. 
Previous to Mr. Walsh's arrival in Port au Prince, the 
French and British consuls, in conjunction with the Commer­
cial Agent of the United states, had urged Soulouque, who 
had recently proclaimed himself Emperor 'austin I, to accept 
a definitive peace. When this proposal was turned down the 
mediating powers suggested a ten year truce. Walsh pushed 
15Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United states 
(4th ad., rev., New fork. o. Appleton-century company, 
1943), p. 278. 
16Wa1sh to the Duke de Tiburon, Haitian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, February 7, 1851, quoted in Welles, op.cit., 
I, pp. 116-17. 
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the latter idea strongly but the responses of the Haitian 
government remained negative. After four months of fruit­
less talks -the representatives of the three powers departed 
empty-handed except for the promise that hostilities would 
not be renewed without notification to their governments.-17 
Dominican President Buenaventura B~ez,18 miffed at the 
governments of the United states, France, and Britain for 
their failure to guarantee protection from Haitian onslaught, 
in 1858 appealed to Spain to establish a protectorate' over 
her former colony. Spain, however, was not anxious to annex 
a hornet's nest as -it feared that assumption of an active 
role might awaken the jealousy of the United States, and 
alienate the sympathies of the Cuban slaveholders.-19 Once 
again the Dominicans, under a new president, Pedro Santana, 
looked to the United States for protection. On November 2, 
1853 President Franklin Pierce's Secretary of State, William 
L. Marcy, instructed General wi11i~. L. Cazneau to proceed 
as special agent to Santo Domingo. General Cazneau, an avowed 
expansionist, pressed for closer relations between the United 
States and the Dominican Republic. On the strength of 
l7chester Lloyd Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900 (New 
York. Prentice-Ball, Inc., 1936), p. 79. 
l8B'ez was president five times. Bis terms were as 
follow.. September 24, 1849-February 15, 1853, October 8, 
l856-Ju1y 7, 1857, December 8, 1865-May 28, 1866, May 2, 
1868-December 31, 1873, December 27, 1876-March 2, 1878. 
19Jones, op.cit., p. 80. 
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Cazneau's assurances that ·President Santana's ruling policy 
is indubitably the creation of the Dominican Republic as an 
independent American power, preferably under the protection 
of the United states,·20 coupled with his glowing descrip­
tion of the Republic's natural wealth, the Pierce administra­
tion released instructions on July 17, 1854 to Casneau to 
negotiate a treaty of friendship, commerce, and naVigation, 
with the stipulation that Article 28 of the proposed treaty 
was to grant the United States a naval and coaling station 
at Saman' Bay.21 
Word of the negotiations leaked out, however, and 
France and Great Britain protested this attempt to secure 
special privileges of a military character in the Caribbean. 
When British and French warships, summoned by the two Euro­
pean representatives, Sir Robert Schomburgk and Maxime 
Raybaud, positioned themselves in Dominican waters Santana 
and Cazneau became convinced that force might be used to 
prevent ceding of Samana. Cazneau attempted to withdraw the 
treaty but ·Schomburgk and Raybaud, in order to ensure defeat 
of the treaty in the United States Senate prevailed on the 
Dominican government to insert a clause to the effect that 
coloured Dominicans travelling in the United States would be 
20Casneau to Marcy, January 23, 1854, quoted in Welles, 
22.cit., I, p. 144. 
21Rayford W. Log-an, Baiti and the Dominican RerubliC 
(New lork and Longon: Oxfora unIversity Press, 1968 , p. 37. 
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accorded the same treatment as white Americans.- 22 Secre­
tary of State Marcy realized such a proposal would meet with 
early defeat at the hands of Southern Senators and so did not 
submit the treaty for ratification. 
In 1856 President Santana attempted once again to 
negotiate a treaty with the United States. The treaty con­
tained only the standard stipulations of friendship and 
commerce but -rumors that the treaty included a secret con­
vention leasing Sam&nA Bay to the United States stirred 
renewed aotivities by Schomburgk and Raybaud • • • [in~ 
Santana, realizing that he could no longer look to the United 
States for support, resigned on May 26, 1856.-23 After a 
succession of chief executives Santana returned from exile 
to become President for the third time on January 31, 1859. 
Santana was still convinced that the survival of the Domin­
iean Republic rested with its being annexed by a foreign 
power and so pressed for negotiations with his last remaining 
hope, Spain. By March of 1860 arrangements with Spain were 
nearly complete. Propagandists created sympathy among the 
people for the idea of Spanish annexation by claiming that 
Spain had regenerated herself into a modern nation. With 
ever-increasing enthusiasm it was explained that Spain pos­
sessed railways and steamships, encouraged popular education, 
22Ibid., p. 38 •
........... 

23Ibid., p. 39 •
........... 
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and had repealed oppressive laws relating to industry and 
commerce. 24 
Spain watched the government of the United states 
drift toward Civil War and decided that the time was oppor­
tune to recapture the glory of a lost colonial possession. 
On March 18, 1861 the negotiations were made public and 
Santana addressed a letter to Isabella II, assuring her thata 
The Dominican people, giving a free course to 

those sentiments of affection and loyalty which 

have been so long repressed,'have unanimously and 

spontaneously proclaimed you as their Queen and 

Sovereign, and I, who have now the exalted and 

undeserved honor of being the organ of those sin­

cere sentiments, lay at you~5Majesty's feet the 

keys of this lovely island. 

The Dominicans, however, were not long content under 
a Spanish hand that daily grew more repressive. Educated 
Dominioans chafted under a Spanish administration that 
replaced looal inhabitants in high positions with Spaniards. 
The long awaited economic rejuvenation also was not forth­
coming, as tariffs were manipulated to favor Spanish export­
ers rather than local industry. By 1863 the Spanish army, 
already thinned by yellow fever, was faced with armed rebel­
lion. Bxcesaes committed by both sides only fanned the flames 
of hatred and wrought devastation throughout the land. By 
1865 Spain judged the situation as hopeless and plans were 
24'l'anSill, op.cit., p. 219. 
25British parliamentary pa~rs, 1861, LXV. Papers
relating to Xiinexa£lon of !antoDllngo, p. 28, quoted in 
Stuart, op.ait., p. 278. 
l' 
.uba1t~d to the Spanish Corta. for evacuation. On May 1, 
1865, Isabella waa foroed to .i9A a law revoking the annexa­
tion. Onoe lIIOre the Doainicua wera independent. 
After the ttJUmcipation of slaves in the ualtecl States 
and the defe.t. of the Confederacy the tiCklish pxoblea of 
recognition of Haiti and the Dominican Republic was at onae 
resolved. Also the fact that Spain had enterad the cartbbeaa 
and annexed the DoIIiaicaD Republic -.rous.4 • vraater detera­
in.tion by the Uftited Itat.. that the i.lud should n.ver 
avain be doainated by a foreign power.-a6 A tr.aty of friend­
ship and ~rc. wa. concluded with Haiti in 1164 and dip­
la.atic recognition 800n followed. Bacau.e of the Spanish 
occupancy and ~h. chaotio oonditions which followed the Domin­
ican Republic was not recogni.ed until septe~r 17, 1866. 
,
In 1866 the questicm of SaIIIaft. once -.ore arose. B••• , 
D.OW in his third term .s president, I8&4e overtur.. to s'or_ 
tary of State Sewar4, who v •• by nov a staunch expansionist.
a... sought. lIDDey and a_1t.iona to keep bJ.uelf in power, but 
negotiations vere barely UDder way when a succe.sful revolt 
fO¥Ce4 h.1a into exile. His SUC08.S0r, Jos' Mar!. Cabral, 
howewr, .u equally enthuse.a with the prospect of leasing 
certaia keya and coal I11n.. in S_an_ Bay in ret1U1l for -a 
1d111oD dollars in the charaoter of _ lou Oil jut, equitable 
20 
an4 r •••OIlable GOACU.tiona • • • ~ a nUlbar of pieces of 
bea., artill.~.-21 Cabral al.o aecretly indicatad a will­
ingne•• to ••11 Saaana Bay if it would be more profitable to 
do 80. Thls aU9veatloll (llke so ......y other. in Dominican 
hi.tory) h.r4-p~•••e4 government whichwa. ODe -.ad. by • 
hoped through the a14 requested to consolidate its po.ltlon.~ 
Opposltion in the Dominican cabinet, how.ver, b•••d on the 
conatitutiona1 aaendaent that forb.de tranafer of territory 
through ••le to a foreign power, forced Cabral to renege on 
his previoua offer•• 
Although Preaident Cabral aou9ht to renew ...,otiationa 
a ~volution whicb erupted In Monte Cristi on October " 
18" forced bia adminiatration froa power Oft January 31, 
1868 and placed the e...r-durable .... in the President' a 
cbair for the fourth time. s'-s' retun to power did not. 
brinC) to a halt the plus revard1nq SalUlDaI for b. ·wa. too 
.agacious a stat••BaD t.o fail to recogni.. the value of Ameri­
can protection.-29
a'•• va. barely inaugurated when a .erie. of revolts 
broke out along the Haitian frontier. In order to ..intaln 
his admiDiatratlon be showed hi..elf not only wl1ling to sup­
port a l.a•• conventioD, but went ao far a. to pre.. for out­
27Garata to Seward, MoV8lllber 8, 1866, quoted in Wall•• , 
op.o1~., I, p. 323. 
28Jone., ge.clt., p. 8t. 
2tOt:to Soboenrich, Santo DoIUnloi A CGWl!!X With a Fa:.­

ure ()lew York. Th...eMIlIo COiiiany I 1,1'), p. I'.

-
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ri9hc annexation, a polioy that had led to hi. predecessor'. 
8xilel As hi. position gRW more In.ecure •••• beo_ 
desperate. S.eking to ..lntain b:1...11 in power he .ugge.eed 
that the United State. govern_nt, 
• • • publisb • declal'aUon placing the Domin­

leu Republio uder the proteatiOD of 'the Unit..d 

State., and su.tain the proclamation by aeading 

v••••l. of war to take po•••••ion of a_at 84 

Man.anilla bay., aDd in fact, any othec point.

that. a military nece••ity ••1" requlre. 10 

Such • pxopoe.l .urp••••d e98n the flex:1ble ...aure. that 
Seoretary of St.te Seward bad been contellpl.t.in9 and he was 
force4 in Movember of 1868 to convey to Sa.. the followlng 
.tat_aent. 
'file COIlgn•• of the united State. is alway. 
di.inclined to fORip military conque.ts, per­
hap. mora so DOW than at. any t1ae beretofore. It 
..... unlikely, then-fon, that COIlgres. would 
entertain any other propo.ition for the .....at1on 
of Dominica than ODe which should originate with 
and ha". the aanctlon of the Dominican peop18Al expr••••d in a r.gular Coaatitutional .ann.r.~ 
OIl the Dominican question Seward had the full .ympathy 
of President Andrew Johnson who stated in hi. fourth annual 
_.8ag8 to Convr••• in 1868 that. 
I am ••ti.fiad that the time haa arrived when 

even so direct a proceeding a•• proposition for 

an annexation of the two Republic. of the i.land 

30Sa1tb to Sew.rd, October 24, 1868, Santo DoIlingo, 
Con.ular Dese.. vol. V'. MS. Dept.. of Stat., quotea Iii 
'aa.Il1, op.C1t., p. 267. 
31sevU'd to aaitll, November 17, 1168, quoted in 
Nelle., 02- cit., 1. p. 352. 
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of Santo Domingo would not only receive the consent 
of the people interested but would al!~ give satis­
faotion to all other foreign nations. 
Unhappily for Seward, President Johnson's relations with 
Congress were so strained that his influence was minimal. 
Annexationist ambitions in the Caribbean, therefore, lay in 
abeyance until the advent of the new Grant administration. 
Under the Grant administration ideas of expansionism 
flourished as the ex-general of the U~ion Armies thought 
that -the imperative need of America was colonial expans­
ion.- 33 Grant took note of the plight of the Megro in the 
United States and looked to the Dominican Republic as a place 
where the black man could secure the blessings of -meaningful­
liberty. In his memoirs he states that -I took it that the 
colored people would go there in great numbers, so as to have 
independent states governed by their own race.- 34 With this 
idea in mind be instructed his Secretary of State, Hamilton 
Fish, to d~s~a~ch General Orville E. Babcock to Santo Domingo 
to obtain information reqarding the conditions of the island 
32James D. Richardson, A COmpilation of the Messages 
and pa~rs of the Presidents 01 the Unlte3 States (20 vols" 
New YO~I Bureau of RatIonal Literature, Inc, 1917), XIII, 
p. 3889. 
33Tansill, op.cit., p. 338. 
34U1Y5888 S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. 
Grant (2 vols" New Yorkl eliarles L. Webster 5C:ompany,
1885J, II, p. 550. 
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and the disposition of government and people towards the 
United statee. 3S 
When Babcock arrived in Santo Dominqo in the early 
summer of 1869 he was immediately collared by William L. 
Cazneau and his partner in mischief, Colonel Joseph W. Fabens. 
TheBe two schemers kept the General constantly in their com­
pany allowing him to see and hear only the pleasantness of 
the Republio. Especially did they keep him away trom the 
resident American oommercial agent, J. Somers Smith, who knew 
the true condition ot the island and who trequently -expressed 
in his communiques to the Secretary of State a sharp suspic­
ion of General Cazneau and Colonel Fabens.-36 
Under the direction of Cazneau, Babcock became intimate 
with B'ez and was soon a staunch supporter of the idea of 
annexation. Upon his return to the United States he urged 
President Grant to use his influence amonq members ot Cong~ 
to popularize the idea of annexation. Grant, easily influ­
enced by his friends, acceded to Babcook's desires. Babcock 
was then sent back to conclude the negotiations, which were 
to be signed by Raymond U. Perry, the recent replacement of 
Commercial agent J. Somers Smith, whose only fault had been 
his unwavering honesty. 
Upon his return to Santo Domingo Babcock was once again 
35stuart,oe.cit., p. 281. 

36T&naill, 0e.cit., p. 372. 
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closely supervised by Cazneau and Fabens to insure success 
Iin negotiations with Baez. His instructions, given to him by 
Secretary of State Fish, directed him, in the event a treaty 
was concluded, as an officer of the Army of the United Statesl 
• • • to carry out the agreement of the United 
States contained in said treaty to protect the peo­
ple of that Republic against foreign interference 
while the nation is expressing its will and a180 
to protect the interest and rights which the United 
States may obtain under such convention. 37 
In order to help Babcock in this task he was given a draft 
for $100,000 and the backing of the United States Navy if it 
became necessary to protect the Dominican Republic until the 
will of its people could be ascertained. 
On November 29, 1869 negotiations were concluded 
between the two governments and two treaties were signed, 
one providing for annexation of the Dominican Republic as a 
territory of the United States, and the other (in case out­
right annexation was opposed in the Senate) providing for 
,
the right to lease Samana Peninsula and its fine harbor with­
in fifty year. upon payment of $2,000,000. 38 As soon as the 
documents were signed General Babcock turned over $150,000 
Iin money and munitions to Baez and, accompanied by Generals 
,
Delos B. Sackett and Rufus Ingalls, sailed for Samana Bay to 
hoist the American flag and take formal possession of the 
37Fish to Babcock, September 6, 1869, quoted in Welles, 
op.cit., I, p. 376. 
38Stuart, op.cit., p. 281. 
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newly acquired territory. 
IBaez, feeling his hold on power growing tenuous, appealed 
to Washington for help, this time with results. By the end of 
February 1870, seven American warships were stationed in Dom­
inican waters, with orders from the Secretary of the Navy, 
instruoting the squadron to direct their operations in accord­
ance with the indications of President B.az. The influence 
I
of Baez, who feared interference from Haiti and Dominican 
revolutionaries based in Haiti, is mirrored in the mesaage 
sent to President Nissage Saget of Baiti by the Commander of 
the United States Naval detachment. Saget was warned that 
Wany interference: or attack by vessels under the Haitian or 
any other flag upon the Dominicans during the pendency of 
negotiations will be considered an act of hostility to the 
flag of the United states and will provoke hostility in 
return.-39 
Baez, now safely under the protection of American quns, 
decided the time wa. ripe for a plebiscite designed to demon­
strate the desire of Dominicans to be united with the United 
States. Proclaiming the voting booths open in all the prov­
inces, BaaZ stated on pebruary 19, 1870, that Wit is hig-h i • 
time that the Government should take legal steps to assure 
itself that the desired purpose is in truth the real expres­
39poor to Nissage Sagat, President of Haiti, February 
10, 1870, quoted in Welles, op.cit., I, p. 384. 
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sion of the national wlll. w40 Playing in large part on the 
old fears of Haitian attack the Government-directed news­
paper, the Boletin Oficial, assured the people that ·Santo 
Domingo gains everything and loses nothing • • • Annexation 
means salvation because it will oblige Haiti to respect 
Dominican rights and to maintain a decent conduct and because 
it will persuade all Dominicans to renounce political dis­
putes.-4l 
Needless to say, there was no -real expression- of 
national will. That the voting was not free was evident to 
all. Through his police Baez intimidated opponents of annex­
ation with threats of imprisonment and exile. Major Raymond 
B. Perry, the Amerioan Commercial Agent, stated in a oom­
munitue to Secretary of State Fish thata 
i. Baez has told me several times that if any man 
fpposed annexation he would either shoot him or 
,end him his passports. He also told me that it 
should be a free vote of the people but such was 
not the case. • • • I have seen Baez • • • shake 
his fist in the face of some of his nearest friends 
• • • and tell them he would banish them from the 
island if they opposed annexation••••42he pris­
ons are filled with politioal prisoners. 
When the ballots were finally counted it was found that 
out of 16,000 votes cast only eleven were found to express 
40presldential decree of Baez issued on February 19, 
1870, quoted in Wellea, op.cit., I, p. 384. 
4lBoletin Ofioial, Santo DOmingo, February 19, 1870, 
quoted in wellea, op.cIt., I, p. 385. 
42perry to Fish, June 7, 1870, quoted in welles, ~ 
~., I, p. 386. 
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opposition to annexation. The ever scholarly Sumner Welles 
mentions that these eleven dissenting votes ·were recognized 
as having been cast at the President's instance by his agents 
in order to prevent the proceedings from appearing too 
farcical:- 43 The results were immediately reported to Wash­
ington by the Minister of Foreign Affairs who wrote that 
·the desire is great with Which this country almost unani­
mously is burning to see the conclusion of its annexation 
to the United States.-44 
The soene of activity now moves to Washington where 
the incoming information became a focal point of general 
discuasion. The debate that followed in the Senate brought 
about a serious controversy between President Grant and 
Senator Charles Sumner, a longtime friend of the President. 
The President stood for annexation for reasons already 
stated. Sumner, however, felt the proposed treaty was a 
travesty of justice, and further felt it would allow the 
United States to adopt an aggressive policy toward Haiti 
which his abolitionist principles would not allow. 45 out­
side the Senate the people of America gave little support 
to the project and only a few newspapers came to the defense 
43Welles, op.cit., I, p. 386. 
44Gautier to Fish, March 18, 1870, quoted. in welles, 
oe.cit., I, p. 387. 
45Jones, op.cit., p. 94. 
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of the propo.ed annexation. 46 The Sen.te debat•• were bit­
ter, but Sumner, .a chairman of the Sen.te Ca..itta. on 
Por.ip Affair., wielded too much power and influence to be 
ov.r~. Bi. ar~at. wera also pereua.i"., chief among 
Which are the following. 
A. Tb. propo.ed annexation would probably 
encoura,. further Aaerican acquisitions of C.rib­
bean terri tory and would thus involve the Vnited 
St.tes in ••rious comp1icationa with other powers. 
B. 'fIlere i. 1itUe likelihood of further inter­
vention by Buropean power. in the .ffair. of the 
Dominican Republic. 
c. 'the United State., in the event of aDD.xa­
tion would probably be .addled with a public debt 
much larVer than had been anticipated. 
D. CeDtinued civil war and rebellions would be 
an .ftermath of annexation. 
B. Annexation would impair the pre4oll1nance of 
the colored r.ce in th1,.est Indies and therefore 
would be un~ust to it. 
Wh.n the vote on Dominican aDD••ation v.. fin.lly taken 
on JW1e 30, 1810, the treaty f.iled by a vote of twenty-ei9ht 
to twenty-eight, two-tbirda b.ing nec••••ry for ratification. 
Sumner had ...rged victorious. 'resident Grant, bowever, 
.till .ought to keep the project alive and in hi. aecond an­
nual .....,. to COD9ress on Dec.mber S, 1810, he recommended 
that. 
By joint ..e.olution of the two 80"••• of Congre•• 
the Bx.cati.. he authorized to appoint a co..t••ion 
46~ansili, op.cit., p. 407. 
47••w fork Herald, March 26, 1870, quoted in Tansill, 
op.cit., p. 40~. 
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to ae90tiate a treaty with the authorities of 
San Domingo for the anaeaatioD of that island and 
that an appropriatioD.__ made to defray the expen.e.
of such a ooa.is.ioo. 
Aitllou9h Senate opposltien to aueuticll remained 
strODg, ullplrs oooled enough to allow a proposal to be 
aClopted whiob would peJ!'llit three comai••ioll8J:s to 1Dquire 
Ofto. more into the political and eCOIlomc cond!tion of the 
island. SUllDer, who balieveel our policy should be one of 
-k!a4aes., be...olence, ...istance, aid, belp, protectJ.on, 
and all that is implied in 900d neighborhood,-.' waa alti­
.ately ouatea fro. his committe. Chairmanship for his dis­
s.nting "Ii."s. 
ID li.. with the cODgressional proposal, Pre.ident 
Great entrusted the fact. finding ai••ion to til"... distin­
guished meftl Benjuain 1'••ade, Andrew D. White, and Saauel 
G. How.. After an elaborau and painstaking StU:"V'8y the 
flnal .iew of the tbree investi,atora .as that aDDexation 
would be _st profitable to the UDitad States. fte Grant 
adalnlstration, howe....r, scolded dally by opposition editor­
ials and faced with numerous char.,.s of corruption, va. forced 
to reject further proposals al..4 at annexation of the Domini­
cu Republic. 50 
48Richar4aon, op.cit., IX, pp ••054-85 • 
• 9Quoted 1D Well.s, !p.alt.~-:I, p. '98. 

50Logan, op.clt., p••6. 
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After the ill-iavend effort. of Grut. and Fi.h, the 
United Stat.s lost interest in further territorial expan.mn 
in the caribbean region. When, in 1881, President. 8.101lOn 
of Haiti offered to cade the island of La Fortue to the 
united st.atea, he va. politely refu.ed. At the time, Secre­
tary of State I'rederick T. Prelinpuy.en said that -the 
policy of thi. govemaent • • • ha. teaded towards a.oi4u08 
of po.....ioDa 4isCODDected from the .ain ooatinent.-Sl Ia 
1884 the overture vaa extended ODce .cre, this time for 
either the bay of La M8l. or the islud of 'tort.uga, aa4 once 
agaia the otfar vas refused. ODe last futile attempt was 
made to aDDeX Saman' Bay in 1892, but negotiations were still 
iD the iafant.ila stage vhea President Benjamin Harrison 
decided DOt to flO ahead with the plaa. 52 
United St.ates· luistuce that the Doainican Republic 
RU.t. oe.,.r be cioainat.e4 by a forei9n power had led to a 
policy of &DD8xatioo by Wa.hington lea4ers who favored 
Daited states expaasioa in the Caribbean. After the ill­
faftreu -.fforta of the Grant adaiDiat..at.lon, the unit.ed Sta_ 
lost interest in any further annexation attempts for a vari­
ety of rea8Ons. Chief among the. v•• a refusal by a majority 
of Coagre••ioDal le.der. to embrace the cau.. of expansion 
in the Caribbeu. Popular aupport., whila never treat, diain­
51Stuart, op.oit., p. 283. 

52Jon•• , ge.oit., p. '9. 
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i.hed even more with the announcement of the unsavory finan­
cial operations connected with the project. Indee~in 1892, 
when Dominican overtures regarding the 1eaaing of Saman. 
Bay were leaked to the pre•• , popular agitation in the 
united States waa ao great that President Uli8e8 Heureaux 
was forced to publish an official 8tatement in the Gaceta 
Oficial denying that any 8uch overture was made. Be com­
plained thatl 
The great difficulty i8 your American press.
Whenever a Dominican editor writes anything objec­
tionable or put. my pictu~e in his paper a8 a cari­
cature I put him in prison. That settles it. In 
the United Stat.s, the writers abuse their privi­
lege. and your:.:ruling men do nothinv. That article 
in the Gaceta Oficial i denial that negotiations 
were in pr09resl wIll quiet the people. Then Mr. 
Blaine can ••nd iDAtructiona. We can go to work 
so.. IDOntbs in the future s.cretly. If we succeed 
it will be done before anybody can make any noise. 
If we obl!in no good result, th.re will be no bad 
feeling. 
Although the United State. had lost interest in fur­
ther attempts at annexation, this -did not indicate by any 
means any l ••••ning of united States interest in the aepub­
lics of Hispaniola,_54 for Waahington waa still insistent 
that the Dominican Republic must never be dominated by a 
foreign power. 
53Durham to General John W.~Po8ter, July 22, 1891, 
quoted in welles, op.cit., I, pp. 479-80. 
54Mecham, op.cit., p. 281. 
CHAP'tlIR II 
'IHE CUSTOMS RBCBIVBRSHIP 
The DoBdnican Republic had weathered the turbulence 
and disorder brought about by aaitian and Spanish intrusion, 
and by Unitea Sute.' projects wbieb .i..o .t annexation. 
By 1'00, bowever, a .eri•• of foreign debts, totaling nearly 
forty million dol1ara, into which unscrupulous le.ders like 
,
Baanaventura Ba.. and Uli.e. Ueuraaux had 1.d the tiny nation, 
had placed tbe oa.lnican aepublic in a po.ition of debt 
peonaqe. Citizens of the united States and of .even Euro­
pean nationa became en9&vad in a confu••d scramble for the 
contents of tne Dominican trea.ury. The Doainican Republic 
va. thus menaced with the possibility of foreign intervention 
which might l ••d to indefinite occupation. 
By 1904 Buropean creditor. vere actively urqinq their 
governments to intervene to .ecure payment on their noDds. 
Washington, however, was atill insistent that no intervention 
by a European power in the Western aemisphere wa. to be 
allowed, e.pecially .0 clo.. to American shores. In order 
to forestall eay act.ion which might lead to European inter­
ve.tion, Presideat Theodore Roo.evelt promulgated hi. corol­
lary to the Monroe Doctrine in Which h. • •••rt.d the rivht 
of the United Stat.. to ac~ a. an international policeman 
33 

in tho.e countries where chronic wrongdoing or impotence 
prevented thea from ...ting their international obliga­
~ioD.. The following year .aw the in.tallment of the Pre.i­
dent'. policy on the .ummons of Dominican Pre.ident Carlos 
r. Moral•• , who at the time w.s .orely menaced by domestic 
and foreign an~a9oni.t.. Roo....lt establi.h.d a cu.toma 
receiv.rship de.iIDed to control and direct Dominican reve­
nue. whieb be belleved would br1nq peace to the i.land and 
.ati.fy clamoring foreign or.ditor.. Unfortunately, the 
1009 awaited stability v.. not forthcoming and the plan that 
v•• admirable in its qualiti•• bec... but the first of a 
••ri•• of .tapa that led to outright ailitary intervention 
1D 1916. 
~. year 1869 witn•••ed the ,en••l. of the Dominican 
~debt when Baen.ventura Baa., confronted vith depreciated 
currency and threatening revolutionarie., negoUat.d an 
advance of t757,700 from a group of Engli.h banker. headed 
by Hartmont 'Co. The loan v•• typical of the exorbitant 
di.count rat•• wbich poor and un.table countries had to 
pay. Sumner wellea co_nt. that -the terma were of so 
on.rous a character a. to be almost incredible.-S5 
As finally agr.ed upon, the loan wa. reduced to ~20,OOO 
by the Dominican senate of which tlOO,OOO w•••armarked .a 
a oomai••ion for Hartmont 'CO. Por the ~inin9 t320,OOO 
5"ell•• , op.oit., I, p. 35t. 
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the Doa1aicaD government plad,ed it.••lf to pay 158,'00 
annually for twenty-four year., a .UII ..,ut.1nV to IIOre tlaan 
four t.1... the face value of the. loan. All .ecurit.y, the 
DouaLo_ go.e.r:ruaent. pledpd the ent.ire re.ources of the 
bpub11e--spaeifically, t.he customs re'ND'Ge aDd the revenu.s 
frOll cg\1aJlO, coal, aaho9uy ud other forest. product... Bart­
aont I CO. sold boRd. UIOWlt1l19 to 1,757,700 to the public 
at. rate. ruvin9 fZ'OJD 50 to 70 par cent, but by re••on of 
neglect, fraud, or deliberate defalcat.ion, only 138,095 
wa. recei..d and accounted for by the DoIIinican 9oveZ1m8nt. 56 
Baa. and the Dominican Senata, realising they were baing 
..reile••1y fleeced, canceled the contract in 1870. Interellt 
on outllt.aDding bond... ,paid until Augut. 1872, wban t.he loaD 
went into clefaalt.. The borrowed .olleY wu intended t.o pro­
aot. roada and railways, but in.tead wa. \1••ct to ol.''U.b Bae.' 
OPPOUAt. and l1l1e the pocket. of his .upporters.. Further 
default. under followin, admini.trations ..t. increasing objec­
tion from the British 90varnMllt., which ij4 retro.-pect. aU9­
vr.4 poorly for the futvre. 
Bet.en 1872 and 1888 tbe .tory of the DoIIhd.can debt 
is on. of steady acauaulatiOll of. floatinq indebtednes•• 
Salari•• of civil servant.s wara left unpaid, cla1aa lor 
injurie••uflend in the _y "-mlutions ware fre.ly exteadld, 
'" 
5'Jacob B. Bol1ander, -'fhe aaadju.taent of SaD Doaingo'a 
Pinance.,· Q!!rterly Journal of BOODa.ie., XII, (May, 1907), 
p. 405. 
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treasury bill. .ere printed for the purchas. of war aater­
lal, and tunds for current expanditure .ere borrowed from 
lIIDD8y leaders ~ p:eec1 knew JX'! boUDd.. 'lbe BartsDont 
fi••co had, for the tlae bein" discouraged further bond is­
.ue., whicb placed the Dominican 90vernaent at the ..roy of 
the Mrahut lender. of' the Republic Wo.. intere.t. rate. 
were DOt. inireqUutly as h19h a. 10 per cent a moath, COIl­
pounded IIODthly. 8y 1888 the total bonded d.ebt. of the Repub­
lic had ri.en to $3,850,000. 57 
'lbe l ••t fifth of the aueteaoth eent.ury wa. the period. 
of another diotator, Vli••• aaure.we, who bee... PX'e.i4ent 
00 Septe.ber 1, 1882. Apparently of ille,ittm.te birth, 
aear••ua obtained the pr.ctic.l .ducation of a .0141eX' in 
the field. ....rl••• , oruel, Ma.ual, and a l ••der of ~, 
he dominated Doainlcan affair. until an ......In·. bullet 
eDde4 bi. tyraaay 1n 1899. Of hi. a4a1ni.tJ:ation, Profe••or 
en••ter Lloyd JODe••t.t•• that, 
lleuzoeaux' rul. wa. to be one in which the 
"public .lid eteadily from a bad to • wor.e poai­
tiOB ana 014e in which there developed abu••• whiob 
...48 the Do1Unican Republio ln the early year. of 
the twent.ietil cent.uzy the center of f.a:-n....cbinv 
int.emat.ional ooalie.tion. thn.tening the contin­
ued .xi.teDee of the nation. 51 
Juat as Pre.ident. S.{e. had dOM in 18'9, aod14 Pre8i­
dent Beveaux 1». 1888, eabarl'u.e4 by aD empty utlaaury and 
58Jon•• , OR.cit., p. f5. 
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h.raa••d by do.atic and foraip creditor., tUrD to the 
foraiva mon.y aarketa ••• solution for the "public's 
fLruUlci.l ill.. A contraot w.. entered into with ..stendoz'p 
,. Co., of ~ta:rd.. which provided for tbe i.aue of ~70,om 
thirty-y.ar 6 per cant go14 boDda. TO plaoate Briti.b bau­
er. and tn. .oritl.h 9ov.rnaent.~th.;:'.\111 of tA2, 860 wa. to be 
uaed to liquidate the BartD:Jnt loan. Since ~ Dol'd.niou 
govern.ent had rec.ived only about $150,000 fro. Hartmont, 
it found ita.lf p.ying b.ck ~l for $1 wheD at the time the 
pound w•• worth $4.80. 59 The ...11 SUll of t50,OOO\>:'Was .ar­
aark.d to payoff the interior floating debt whil. w••ten­
dozp ,. Co. bought the rea.inder of the bonda at 78 per cent 
of their face value. For security, W••tendorp , Co. was 
91....11 • freah l1en OD CWltom.a revenue., which weI.'. to be 
collected thJ:'Ough • board of .gents, the r~i., who were to 
collect the aJIOlIDt n.c••••z:y to s.rvice the loan chUge. 
and pay for collection .xpenses. ~he resaininv revenue Wd 
to be turned over to the Doad.Rican 90veX1lMnt. 
In 18'0 a ..cond lOaD in the ._ of it'GO,OOO, redeem­
able in fifty-six year. at the rate of 6 per cent, wa • 
••gotiat.d. with ...tendorp ,. CO., to ••cure funda for the 
construction of a railroad froa Puerto Plata to Santiqo. 
Unhappily for DoIail'lican., Seureawe u••4 aoat of the aoney 
to rid billa.lf of freab accuaalatioD8 of floatiDe; iDdebtad­
"Logan, !R*c1t., p. 50. 
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ne•• and equandered the rest on per.onal extravagance•• 
In the lIlfIan'tJ.ae, W.atendorp , Co. encounterea 90vemment 
interference in the collection of customs dutie.. When 
Heareaux de.ired fund. he would seize certain revenues and 
pledge them to local merchants to obtain whatever he needed'O 
,
As a re.ult, the regie was unable t.o .ervice the bonds. 
When Seureaux defaulted on the two We.tendorp loans 
in 1892 the Amaterdaa banking firm applied to two New York 
attorneys to negotiate a sale of the bonda to the United 
States government. Washington flatly refused the offer, but 
Secretary of Stat. roater suggested that an American fira 
take over the duti.. of We.tendorp to foreatall any transfer 
of intereats to Prench or German bankers.'l Immediately the 
co1Ml1••ionea attorney., Smith M. Weed and Charles w. Welle., 
orqanized the San Domingo Improve_nt Company of New York 
and acquired the rights and obligations of We.ten4orp , Co. 
Sy 1893 the San Dolllingo Improvement Co. had become the DoaiaJr. 
can aepublic·. banker. 
Fresh DODey va. es.ential if Heur.aux waa to maintain 
hi. despotic control. The tyrant s.cured it in the form of 
two loans from the San Domingo Improvement Co. ~hicb agree:S 
to extend a ~otal ot $3,285,000 to refund old obli9atlon. 
6GSohoenrich, op.cl~., pp. 355-56. 
'lDana G. Itunro, IJl~e"eJ'ltioD and Dollar Di810auaCX in 
the CaribbeaD 1,00-1921 (lew :ter••y I Jrliice£onnlveraIty
'ra••, I".', p. 80. 
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and to meet new debts. The fifth, sixth, and ••venth loana, 
totaling $4,250,000 were extended in 1893-95 for the purpose 
of diacharqing floating debts and quieting indemnity claiD.~ 
Although not always harmonious, the working relations between 
ReuraauK ana the San Domingo Iaprovement Co. were close. 
When, in 1895, France threatened to ••iz. the Dominioan cus­
tom houses because of tbe dictator's treatment of the French 
owned national bank, the San Domingo Improvement Co. came 
to hi. a••istance and undertook to payoff the indemnity 
which France required and later bou9ht the stock of the 
bank and operated it as its own property. In 1897, when the 
Dominican government once again defaulted on the payments of 
ita foreign debt, the company carried through another refund­
ing operation and undertook to float an e19hth bond 18aue 
of ~2,736,750 in bonds at 2 3/. per cent and 11,500,000 in 
bonda at • per cent. ~he i.sue was d••igned to convert all 
previous bonds then outstanding and pay overdue interest 
while supplying the Dominican government with $1,000,000 in 
caah.') 
The San Domingo Improvement Co., however, waa not a):)le 
to carry out the contract to ita full.at extent because of 
a lack of funda. Bventually the conversion of older bond 
ia.uea was completed, but at enormous cost. 'rof•••or Jacob 
62aollander, ge.cit., p. 410. 

6)schoenr1ch, Of.cit., p. 357. 
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B. Hollander reports of the trans.ction a. one which. 
• • • involved aut-throat terms, and unchecked 
procedure. Instead of the .conomical and orderly
readjustment that waa to put the financial bous.­
hold of Santo Domingo in order to re-establish her 
public oredit, there reaulted • awollen debit, 
loose in con.atruction, 8"IVioiou8 in detail, and 
foredoomed to break dOWD. 
During Rauraaux' administration the San Domingo I.~ 
_nt. Co. paid the Dominican governll8nt from 30 to 43 per cent. 
of t.he face value of the .ecuritiea and in the aain aold 
'the:~bonds not to AlBerioans, but to Europeans, aostly 1n 
Belgium and France. Deception of evary type was practiced 
by the bond .ellers as evidenced by the tact that a large 
number of the Prench holders of Doainican bonds vera poor 
Catholic peasants in France vho were told that they were 
buying securities of the Dominican religious order. 6S other 
investors ware attracted by the supposed security afforded 
by the company'. right t.o oollect customs duties and the 
quarantee written into each loaQ contract that the company 
could ask the Dutcb, Belgian, British, Prench, and United 
States governments to appoint a board of commis.ioners to 
(Jollect cuato... in ca.. of default:. 
The guarantee. proved illusory, hove..r, as the 001180­
t10a agents, who "ere Dominicans t practiced .wry type of 
fraud, whicb served only to reduce customs revenues to a 
64Ho11and8r, op.cit., pp. 410-11. 
65Munro , 22_cit., p. 81 
-
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trickle. Needless to .ay, though successive defaults occur%8d, 
no five power government board was set up to insure payment 
on the loans, partly because the various qovernments d!ffemd 
over the 1.'01•• they would play, and partly because the San 
Domingo Improvement Co. felt they could always find more 
gullible investors to line their pockets with silver. By 
the turn of the century, however, it proved nearly impos­
aible to sell any aizeable number of bonds, and the ftepub­
lic was again in default when Heureaax was a.aaaainated in 
July of 1899. 
It wa. felt that Heureaux' passinq might usher in a 
period of respODsible government, but the huge foreign debt 
that saddled the Republic, coupled with the inability of 
political leaders to reooncile tbeir differenc•• , dasbed 
all auch hopes. In financial matters the worst features of 
Heuraaux' ad~lniatration were intensified. Each succes­
sive pr.sident, barried by political rivals, became a more 
recklea. borrower, and each new loan v•• obtained upon 
harsber terms. Profe.sor Hollander reports that -the nomi­
nal rate of interest upon pUblic loans vas rarely 1... than 
2 per cent per lftOnth, and, with respect to funds or values 
actually received, ••veral times that rate.-66 Profe.sor 
Hollander g088 on to state that on the eve of the establish­
ment of the CustOll8 aeoeivershl;tp by the United Statea ill 
66Hollander, op.cit., p. 411. 
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1905 that Santo Domingo waa found to bel 
••• a cOltf••••d baDknpt, whoa. public faith 
v.a 41.0...41t.4 no 1... at. ho.. than in e..ry fin­
ancial az:oket of the world, .mo•• cnll:re,at. debits 
wn hawked about a. litt.le beteer thaD w••te paper,
whoa. people ware czu.he4 under a ga1lin9 barden 
of t.axation, who.. Dataral reaoUS'C.a were IIOngaged 
1A extraYagant or ...!-fraudulent CODc.aaiona, 
who.. legiti_te oreditors were left without ~­
aatlon or red....s, ud who.e po11tical exiatence 
va. threatened by cont.ractual obligations and inter­
national al;--t8 in tbe intere.t. of fonip
crecU.tora. 
!'he poaition occupied by the San Dom1D90 Xapro~t 
co. wa. 1Ulsatiafaotory to all involved parti.s. '!'h. coapany 
wished. to teJ:Jdnate ita r.spouibi1itie. anet the Dominican 
fOverDaent, b••ded now by Juan X.iAro 3i-'ne., 80re1y 
vanted to speea it. vithdr.val as tbe OO1Ipany vas thoroughly 
hat.d by Doainic..s becau.. of ita long association with 
seureaux." The probl•• "a. fiDding securit.y vhioh would 
allow the coapany to vit.b4rav without jeopardizinq tbe In\\e­
.sts of it. owners. 
In spite of hosttle public opinioD,Preai4eDt Ji-*ne. 
ill Marcb of 1900 endorsed a plan which would have allowed the 
co.pany to contiDue custom. co1l.ctions in return for finan­
cial CODCe••iona. Prench and Be19ian boDdho14.... , howeftr, 
refaaect to aiX88 to further conce••ions and cne .e19iaD 
voftmaeat notified the DoainicaD gOftrnaen.t that the coapany 
67Ibid.., p.412.
-
"Melvin M. bight, fte ....I:io_. in auto DoairaSlo 
(lIl.v Yorks Vuguud .res., 1121), p. 1,. 
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no lon!er repr••ented ita national's intereat. J1m6ne., 
disfJUst:ed over bi. propo••l be1nq reject.ed, 'terminated the 
San Domiftgo Improvement Co.'. right to collect Gusto.. , 
although he ••t up • oomaission to withhold ., per cent of 
the custou rece"pta to insure payaent to the bondholders. 
What followed was financial confusion. GoVernments began 
to act independently of the San Domin,o Ilapro...nt eo. and 
in support of their own citiz.ns,and a confu.ed scraable 8z 
the content. of the Dominican tr.asu~ ensued. 
In ..etug a solution, Pre.id.ent 3i-'ne. entnated. 
bi. Minister of Foreign Affairs with the ta.k of making .ep­
arate arrangements with the Prench and Belqian bondholders 
and with the %1BpZ'O"l'eMllt Co. The n.90tiations proved suc­
cessful, but when the Doa1nican Collgn•• approved the a9ne­
1II8Dt with the European bondholders and Dot vith the Improve­
_at Co., ne" aoaplioatiolUl aro••• 
'1'0 thi_ point, the UD.ited Stat.e. State Departaent 
bad lent little support to the laprov....t 00.'_ plight, 
their only .u9gestion being that the Doa1nican Republic 
buyout the bated aGapey. '!be obstacle encountend hare, 
of cours., .a. DoMinican oppeaition and the lack of funds 
to carry tbrou,h such an .91:8 ....t.6' With the .qre...nt 
that 'l." the rnllCJh and Belgian bondholders a lien on the 
cu.towus of Santo DoIl1DfO anet San Pedro de Macori., however, 
"Ibid.
-
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the St.au Departaent deoided that Amriou intereats vere 
not. going to be .lap1y di.1I1••ed. Secntary of State John 
8ay, di.t.ul:bed over: wbat be tel'Dld -di.criai.aUon againat 
Amerioan ca.pani••- informed the Legation at santo Domingo 
to inform tha DoII1nio&DS that tbe .AlRerican government w.. 
-not dispo.ed to pa•• over unheeded the equities of the 
.Aaer1can companie.- and that if all other _thode of 
atteaptea .ett.1...nt faile4, the Domi.ioan gO¥e~"Dt .hould 
allow arbitration. 70 
Secretary Hay probably di4 not iot.end that. the Lega­
tion vigoroua1y .upport the IJBproYeaent. Co. 'a olai., but 
Willi.. P. powell, Mini.ter to saiti, wbo carried out Bay'. 
inacruct.ions in Santo DoIIiftqo, addre•••d a DOte to the 
Dollioioan gOYeraaent. that demanded,1n .0 unoertain teras, a 
.ett.le.at ••ti.factory to the SaD oo.iag'O Iaproveaent co.71 
The Stata Department. nprimandad hta for hi. oversealo••­
ne.. and hi. failure to .ake alear: that the State Dapart­
aent wa...rely offeriag ita good offiae. to aftect a 
••tt.l....t. In .pite of t.hia r:epriaand, however, Powell 
w•• instruoted to proceed witb hi••fforts to persuade the 
Doainioan governmaDt to enter into oon.tructive negotiationa 
with the Impzoy_nt Co• 
• eqotlatiolUl in 1901 0_ to nothing and were iDtex­
10Hay to Powell, JIUlUAry 20, 1902, quoted. in JlaDro, 
01'-01t., p. 83. 
71J'owall to Hay, february 22, 1902, quoted in Munro, 
op.cit., pp. 83-4. 
I
rupted in 1'02 vben a revolution ousted Jt.8n.. aDd placed 
IBoracl0 V.sque& ln the President's chair. When discus.loDs 
.er. once IIOre interred into, the Iaprov...nt Co. stale­
mated progre•• with ita refusal to suba1t 1ta tinancial 
accounts for governmental inspection after it had agreed 
to acaept .',500,000 lnstead of the orlgina1 $11,000,000 lt 
had de1llaD4ed. The State Department sugCj8sted the whole 
quasUon be s.ttl.d by arbitration but altered itts position 
to urge arb:t.trat:t.Oll on only bow the SWI should be. pald.72 
After .uoh political bickeriDg a protocol was signed on 
January 31, 1'03, whereby the Doainican government a9reed 
to pay the United Stat.s 90veraaent, for the San DoaiDqo 
Iaproveaent Co., the sum of $',500,000 in 901d. fte JUDner 
in whlch the money was to be paid and the conditions under 
which the I.prov...nt Co. would relinquish its properties 
were to be ascertained by arbitration between the two govern­
ments. Thls brought about the end of prlv*te receivership 
and forei9ft creditors were now justified in looking to their 
gove:.maen'ta for oollection of debts. 
The Dominioan government, under President V4s.ua., 
went ahead with plana to .aleot an arbitral cOlllti••ion, but 
• succes.ion of revolutionary uprisings 8ucc••~d in plac­
inq General wo. y Gil, a onetime lieutenant of Keura.us· in 
the Pre.ident's abair, who vas opposed to the nevly aigned 
72Munro, op.cit., p. 85. 
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protocol. It .a. not. until December that the arb!tral 
oommis.ion finally met. In ita final deoislon the board 
fixed the inter.st rate at 4 per cent and stated that the 
monthly payments were to be $37,500 a month for two years, 
and '41,6'6 a DIOnth thereafter. In ca•• of falluxe to pay 
from cu.tome revenue. secured on the northern coast, a 
financial agent of the United State. was to take over the 
Puerto Plata oustombou.. and carry out the .gr....nt. 7l 
Unfortmaate1y for Dominicans, a new ••rie. of revolu­
tionary outbreaks oCO\lrred which diarapted the country and 
placed a new ~litary leader, Carlos Moral•• , at the head 
of the 9OftZ'lUllent. In the face of auch chaoa, it. waa < impos­
sible for the Dominican governaent to make any payments on 
the foreign debt. and, in compliance with the tens of the 
3uly award, an American financial agent took over the custo... 
house of Pu.rto Plata on October 21, 1904. In HoveJlber 
MOral.s .stAblish.d hi...lf .s President, but civil strife 
continued unabated a8 the supporters of foraer President 
J1men.. continued to ravage the countryside. In the fac. 
of such uttar breakdown in orderly government, the French, 
following the Amerioan exampla, threatened to take over the 
Santo Domingo customhous., an action whioh would ha.. para­
lyzed the government for lack of funds. 
46 
In its relations with the Dominican Republic in 1902­
1903 the State Department concerned itaelf primarily with 
settlement of American claims by insisting on arbitration, 
a normal part of its work. Roosevelt and Hay gave no indi­
cation that either wished to obtain control of the Repub­
lic'. internal operations. Indeed, at a later date, Roose­
velt atated that he thought the pressing of the San Domingo 
Improvement Co.'. claim had been a mistake which a criti­
cally ill Hay would not have allowed if he had been a well 
man. 74 
In the first months of 1904, however, Roosevelt' 8 
attitude changed .s he began to see the need for policies 
which would prevent further inoidents like the Venezuela 
blockaqe of 1902. In Roosevelt'. opinion, the Latin Amari­
can nation most susceptible to European intervention was 
the Dominican Republic. With alarm he noted that rivalries 
between creditor powera had placed the Dominican government 
in a moat unfortunate position and that numerous revolution­
ary outbreaks had, in April of 1903, prompted a German war­
ship to land 150 men to protect the German consulate. Ital­
ian and Dutch shipa a180 entered the harbor. 7S He also 
knew that complete anarchy had engulfed the nation in the 
Pall and American, Prench, Italian, Dutch, and German ve••els 
74Munro, op.ci t., p. 87. 

7SporeiSln Relationa e °E·cit., 1903, p. 391 
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had landed military peraonnel to protect their respective 
foreigD intere.ta. 76 In a letter to J.B. Bishop, dated 
February 23, 1904, Roosevelt expressed his attitude, .t.~ 
I have been hoping and praying for three .onths 
that the Santo .DoJI1Dgana would behava ao that I 
would not have to act in any way. I want to do 
nothing but what a policeman has to do in Santo 
Domingo. As tor annexing the island, I bave about 
the .... d.sire to annex it a. a gorged boa con­
atrictor mlght bave to 8wa110w a porcupine wrong­
end-to. If I possibly CaD, I vant to do nothing 
to them. If it. is absolutely nec.ssary to do SQae­
thing, than I want to 40 as little a. pos.ible. 77 
Jtooaevelt proce.ded cautiously, however, .a 1'04 vaa 
an election year. In May, at a banquet commemorating the 
aecond anniversary of the independence of CUba, a .b.a_l.lo.D_ !' 
eaaal waa releaa.d. In a speech read by Elihu Root, he 
declared that the prinCiple deaire of the United Statea 
va. ~to ae. all neighboring countries stable, orderly and 
prosperoua,· aDd elaborated fur~.r that if a nation demon­
strate. that • 
• • • it knows how to act wlth decency in in4ua­
trial and political mattera, if it k..ps order and 
pay. ita obligations, then it n.ed f.ar no inter­
ference from the United St.atea. Brutal wrofteJdo!ng, 
or an impotence which reaults ln a ,enera1 loosen­
iag of the tle. of oivili.84 aociety, may finally
require intervent.lon by aome civilized nat.ion, and 
7''tulio Manuel Cestaro, Batado. Urai40a t las Antilla. 
(Madrid, 1931), quoted in Jone., 02_cl£., p.G!. 
77Joseph Buoklin Bishop, 'lbeodore Roosevelt and His 
ft_ Shown in Bla OWn Letters (2 'VOl•• , Ii" lorE I eliari•• 
~crlbn.r·s lana, 1,1,,1120), I, p. 431. 
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in the Westarn HemsPbere the Dnited State. can­

not 19non this duty. 78 

After a decisive victory at the polla in Hove.bar, 
Roosevelt, ·oonvinced ot the deavera inherent in the policy 
of negation and _diat.ion, "·which he had pur81Nd in the 
Vene.Qalan criais, ·eabarked upon a cour.. of pO.itive 
action in the OOa1nican Republic 1n 11ne with hi. own char­
acter.·7' W1th enoouragement froa the MOrales qovernment, 
wbich bad, for some time, desperately appealed for aid, 
Roosevelt restated hi. pronouncement of May the 20th in bi. 
annual ....age to Conqre•• 01'1 December " 1904, apecifically 
declaring that. 
Chron1c wroDg-doing, or an impotence wbleh 

results in a general looseniD9 of the tie. of 

c1vi1i••4 society, may in Aaerica, as el.ewhere, 

ultimately require intervention by aome civil­

ized nation, and in the western Hemisphere the 

adherence of the United Stat.. to the Monroe 

Doctrine may force the United Statea, bowever 

reluctantly, in flagrant cas.s of auch wrong­
40iJuj or iIIpot.Dce, to.r'e ex.ni.e of an inter­

national police power. 

Following Roosevelt'. addrea.,Bay cabled the American 
Minister, Tho... C. Dawaon, on Deoeaber 30, 1904 and directed 
78a. 'ringle, Theodore Roosevelt (Nav rork, 1931), 
quoted in Dexter perilna, X Ilatog of the Moa.roe !)oouine 
(Bo.~on. Little, Brown and eompany, 115S), pp. 231-3'. 
7'Howard C. Hill, Ph.D., Roosevelt and the Caribbean 

(Illinois. UniY.~.ity of Chicago '~••• , 1,27), p. la8. 

80Ho118e Docu.ment )10. 1 (Pifty-eighth CoDtre•• , third 
••••ion), quotea in 1111, 0e.cit., p. 149. 
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him tOI 
.0UDd ~h. Pr••ident of Santo oo.iD90 di.oreetly
but .arae.tly and in • perfectly fr1.Ddly .pirit,
touching the disquieting .ituation which i. devel­
oping ovin, to the pre••ure of other government.
h••iAg' ubiual awarde 1n their fa'VOr and who 
regard our award .. conflioting with their rights.
• • • You will .eoertain whath.r the Government of 
Santo DoaiD90 would be dispOs.d to request the 
anitad States to take ohar,e of the collectioD of 
duties and effect an equitable di.tribution of the 
•••igned quot.s IUIODg the DoIdnican aoftJ:lllleDt: and 
the ....1'.1 clai.-nta.81 
To aid DawaOD in n_fJOtiating • plan that would allow Aaarioan. 
representative. to a4a1nl.ter customs collectioD, Roosevelt 
arranged tor Commander Albert c. DilllnghD, a Daval officer 
po•••••iDg wid_ knowleqe of the island, to a••iat the 
Minister in any way he could. 
OIl January 20 aD a9reeaent known •• the Dlllingh.... 
S~chez protocol vaa .19De4, providlng for a guaranty by 
the United States 90ve:maeJlt of Dominican t.rritorlal integ­
rity and for control of all Doainlcan customhou••• by the 
United State.. Debate over certain details, .uoh a. the 
clau•• guaranteeing Dominican territorial inte,rit.y, delayed 
the COJIIpletioD of negotiationa UIltil February 7, 1905, wheD 
a Dew pzotocol wu 8igned which .tipulate4 that. the United 
States .hould tum over to the Dominican 90ver_t. 45 per 
cent of all custoM r.venu.e While Wlinv the reaaiDing 55 per 
cent. to ••nice the Republic'. fore190 and 4omesUo debt.. 
8180u.. DoaUMIlt. 80. 1 (Fifty-ninth Con9n•• , fir.t 
••••1on), qaotil In DIll, !i_oit., pp. 158-59. 
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It wa. al.o agreed that the unit.ed State. would grant. the 
Itepublic ...1.tanae in rIIstori.ng the oredit, pre...:v1n'l the 
order, anel fo.t.tu:1ng ..terial PI'09"•• for t.he welfare of 
her oiti••n8. 82 
In subia.t.tt..b, the protocol to the Senate on rebruary 
15, 1905, ,nsielut RooMvelt urged it. accept.ance, saying 
that the United Sat•• gover_nt. coulch 
••• not vl'th propriet.y .ay that it. will pro­
tect. it. ow cU:i..na and inter.ata Oil the one 
hand, ud ye' on t:be other hue! refue to allow 
other 90veraaant. to protect their citiaens and 
iaun.'.. • • • £ia4 caut.ioned thaj those who 
profit by the Nollroe Doct.rine aWlt. acaept certain 
r ••poa81bilit.i.s aloftg with the ri,ht. which it GOllf.r.~83 
Bncounter1ag oppoaition within the Senate, evan though the 
Senate poreign Belation. Caa.!ttee reooamended approval, 
Roo.evelt, in ••peclal ....a'. of Naroh 6, 1905, 8tre••ect 
the poat tbat. I 
Saato Doaiago ,r1evou.ly 11..4& the a14 of • 
powerful and friendly natlon • • • She ha. a.ked 
for thi. aid, and the expre.aloaa of friendshlp 
repeatedly suct.iODed by the people and Govem­
..nt. of the United St.ate. warrut her in belie... 
1Dg "tt it will not be withheld in the hour of her 
need. 
In an atteapt to rally Amerioan opinion behind the 
treat.y in a apeech given at the Chautauqua in Mev York, he 
appealed, in the word. of Prof•••or J. Fred tippy, -to 'the 
81.oreil! Relation., op.cit., 1'05, p. 342. 
8'Ibld., p. 334.
-
84llichardson, op.oit.., XV, pp. "50-51. 
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.tad ad sent1aents of the aYerage lUll,· and stated forth­
rightly that.. 
w. canDOt peZ1l&DeDtly adhere to the Monme 
DootriAe ula.. we .1lOC... in _akinv i 1: evident 

in the fir.t place that we 40 DOt iDtend t.o tna' 

it ••• as aa exou. for a"randi.e.Dt 011 our 

part at. the expeue of the rapublics to the .outh 

of .., aecond, that we 40 not inUD4 to peJ:ait it 

to be a••a by aDy of th... republios .. • shield 

too protect that republic frOlS the oonsequences of 
its own mid••da a,aiD.t. foreign ftetiona, third, 
that ina_ach .. by thi8 doot$iDe "e prevent. other 
nation. f¥Oa interf.riD9 on thi••i4e of the water, 
we .bal1 our.el... in ,ood faith t.ry to h.lp t.ho•• 
of our ai.tar republioa, .,hioh aeed auch help,
upward toward peaae and order. 85 
Boo....lt.'. exhortat.ion. failed to convince the Sena­
ton, howe••r, a. they ".re \1DIlOVed by benevolence, fear 
of Buropean int.rvent.ion, concern for ve.ted int..re.t., or 
expansionist. lapul•••••' seeing that. the t.wo-thil!'Cbl major­
ity n.eded for app~al could not be obt.ain.d, Boo••Y81t. 
allow.d the ..tt.er to be .et. aai4e unt.il the Senate opened 
ita regular ••••ion. in Deceeer. When, on ICarch 18, the 
United St.ate. Senate adjounea without acting on the protocol, 
rD8Dr8 of revolut.ion .pread throughout the oapital aDd for­
eign credit.or. nnewed. their c1eaan4a for payaent. of.·clai... 
'1'0 wor..n the situat.ion, an It.alian crui••r anohored in Santo 
DoaiJl90·. harbor to lu4 .upport. tor It.aliu. olai... ADa. 
cri.i. had arieen. 
85••., fork 'J.aea, Aug'WIt. 12, 1905, quoted in J. rnd 
Rippy, -!'be InitialIOD of the Cu'toaa lecei.er.hip in the 
Doad.n1oaa Republic,· .lepanic ~riou. Hi.tozoic Bevi..." XVII 
(RoYeaber, 1'37), p. ass 
"tippy, cm.oit., p••51. 
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1D the face of upending di•••ter, the Dolainicu Min­
Ister of riDuce Infozmad Dawson that be could aontinue in 
bi. posltion only if a praa_ioal .odu••J.vaadi va. adopted, 
pending ratification of the tzeaty.87 navaoA sounded out 
the claiaanu, and finding only the I1Ip~Dt Co. unreoep­
ti"., cabled the Doadnicaa propoaal to W.ahington. Roo••velt 
approved the propo••d arraDgeaeDt, but aade it clear that 
all po.ts lIould be .ffected, which _at that the IIIpZ'O.e...t 
Co. would 10.e ita control of the northern cuatomhouse.. Of 
the lDODey collected, C5 per CMftt vas .amarked for the Doll­
inioan 9~nt vb1le 55 per cent va. to be placed in a 
Rev l'ork bank until the Senate t:aUf1ed the treaty, in which 
ca•• it would then be distributed ..aD9 the c1aiaant. 1n 
proportioa. to their claba. 
Roosevelt'. pzoposa1. were accepted and the Morale.' 
governmeat signed iato effect the Receiver.bip OD March 31, 
lt05. Within a Ie. week. aoo....lt nomiaated, and Moral •• 
appoiated, Colonel Georg- a. COlton, a long-t1.aa custo... 
collector 1n the Philippine Ielaaa, .e Ceaera1 Receiver and 
Collector. Speakin, later before the S..ate, aao.velt 
justified the Receiver.hip by ••ying that, 
••••tability and order and all the beneflU 
of peace an at 1a.t coai.n9 to suto Doad.Dgo, daD­
PI' of foralp intervent.ion baa been ."pea&ld, ud 
878i1l, OR.olt., p. 161. 
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there i. at lut I,pro.pect that all creditors 
will get ju.~10•• 
Boo....lt'. action. touched off a torrent of abu.. 
aqain.t hi. in the senate. Pol1owin9 the le.d of SeDator 
IIoqu of Alab..., who had .......4 OD the COIIIlitt_ on FOr­
eitn Relationa since 1879, SeDa~ critic. denounced bis cause 
a. \1Doon.titutioaal, .ayiA, that. he had ·put into executloa 
a treaty wbieb the Senate bad l'ef"••4 to approve and that h. 
had e.tabli.h.d a proteotol'ate oyer Santo Doaln90.·S9 !b. 
1IIIOcl•• vivendi, however, e.tablisbed. financial oxel.r aDd the 
Dominican ,ov.r_nt received IIOra ina it••5 per cent. 
shan than it had froll a pre.ioWl 100 per cent, further, the 
Aaerleaa Receiver Gene...al, Colonel Colton, note4 that ch1:r:ing 
it. tweaty-ei,ht .onth. of operation, ·not one .ingle c~ 
plaint Dor lb. of critici•• wa. received frOJll the Doadnicaa 
Govemmeat., nor. troll any consul or .pec1al Z'.pr••entatiftl.·90 
'lbe n.oWl41ng succes. of the .adas Ylvendi ai484 aoo....
• u _ I 
..It in ••curiD, approval by the senate, an4 the executi" 
a"ne_nt was replace4 by • formal treaty which want into 
.ffect on July 8, 1907. The treaty contained the principal 
f.atures of the 1'05 aqAe.nt., omit.ted, howe...r, was the 
a"n.ment of the United State. to respect the t.rritorial 
integrit.y of t:be Doaf.Dican ..public (in defennee t.o S8Ilatol:ll 
.aporei!! Belation., o,.cit., 1'85, p. 36_ 
a'Hill, OR.cit., p. 161 
90roreig! Ralatio•• , 0E.cit., 1107, p. 323 
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who felt theze was little diffe~Doe between r.specting and 
9Urant.eeiD.9 a Dation's territorial inte9rity) ••nd the 
clauee wbich pledged a••i.taDce by the United State. for 
the purpo.. of pn.erviDg oder, which was obj.cted to OD. 
91'OUDd. t:hat -the pZ'O'Y'i.icm would involve the United state. 
in the internal affaira of Santo no.ingo.-'l It was alao 
agreed that the DoaiDican goYeJ:Jll8lt would not iDcr•••• it. 
public debt eaoept by previous agzee..nt with the United 
Stat.s until the full aaouDt of it. foreign obligations had 
been paicl.'Z 
By 1904 flnaDoi&l ai.aan.....nt bad brought the Doaini­
caD Rep1i1blic perilously clo.. to Buropean inteZ'Vent.ion. In 
an .ffort to .ta.. off suoh a thnat, which a!9ht ha.. lad 
to in4efbit.e ocnpatiOD clo.. to AaerioaD shorea. ..asblDg­
ton foWid bers.lf ODoe lIOn deeply lnvolv.. In DaaliDlcan 
.ffalrs. President Roose.elt, with the p~19ation of hi. 
CoZ'Ollaq t.o the MoftZ'oe Dootrine. .",.4 quickly to e.tablish 
• CUstOlU be.i".raMp, which .at.isfied the cluoring foreiCJD 
creditors ad era.." the threat of fo~i9ll iDt.neatioll. 
It was belleved that .uGh aD arru,,_nt. would .lso 
bring pe.ce to the islu4, but rewrring disorders within 
the island ..public deaw.matrata4 tbe weaJul••s of such .. hope. 
91Bi1l , op.cit., p. 167 • 
•arorait! ..lations, !p.cit., 1907, pp. 307-09. 
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III aD at:tellpt to eDd the raO'U'riD9 oyola of insurrectloDs 
in the DOmiDioan ..public the N1ls0D Adainis~atioD broad­
eaed United atate. 1Dvol-..-nt, aDd Roosevelt'. plan, whlch 
was so .4a1.I'01. in ita qualitie., bee_ but the firat of 
a ••1'1•• of .te,. tha~ led ult.lJRata1y to llilitary occupa­
tion in 191'_ 
CHAP'Rlt III 
THE WILSOH ADMI.IS~RATIOK·S FOIBIGH POLICY 
I. IJ.'BB DONINlCU REPUBLIC 
Sinee tme DoIIiDican 1tepablic·. inception as an inde­
pendent nation in 1844, Uaited States foreign policy had 
centered around the i4.. t:hat. the tiDy islan4 ..public 
.uat Myer be dominated by a fonip power. To forestall 
foreign incursioD, tbi. policy had led to atteapta at anne.a­
tiOD in the nineteenth century and to the e.tabliahment of 
a cuatoaa reoeiYerabip in 1905. While the W11son adaiDietra­
tioD adhered to the .st.abliahed policy in respect. to foreip 
incursion, PnsideDt Wilson broadened United Stat•• iawlve­
aaat ia the affaira of the ..public by iasiating on the 
.stabliah..at of a constitutional 4e.oaracy whioh, in hi. 
mincl, v.a necessary to put an eDd to the reourriag cyale. 
of revolution. When it bec_ evident that political and 
fiDaacial .~ility were not to be so easily obtained, 
Wilson reluctantly ordered the aepublic occupied by the 
.arin.s, who were then to •1netruct· tile DoIIinicana in the 
"aye of d..oaracy. 
In the years iaae4iately follOWing ita ••tabliahaent, 
the cuato.. receiverahip ••tabliah.. by Booa.velt ".. a 
financial success. SpaakinCJ of the advantag.s gained, the 
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IDoII1nlcan Miniater of ,irumce, 'ederico Velaaque., in hi. 
auual report for 1906, stated that. 
The i._ of "avenue 4uriD9 1'05 and thoae of 
ItOI apeak clearly, with reaewed eloqaence, of 
fi91lre., that for SOlIe ti_ paa~ we have beeJl 
livln~ in the public poata a life of order and 
hoaesty, where but. a few years a90 lif. with fe" 
exceptions within aDd without the Dational pal­
ace .a. ODe of shamele8ane•• , dilapidation, 
cupidity, an4 peraaaent disgrace for the Republio,
being the prinCipal cau••, if not ~le only one, 
why our weak atate:.haa felt. itself JIOre tho 
once treablin9 Oft the brink of the aby•• , and that 
for a lon, t.t.. we have found our.elve. laCking in 
ecolloaU.o ."t!oQoay, O'ftrwei9hed by debu, _justi­
fiable for the Inater part, ••fferia9 insult. 
and hwdlitie.. :I 
Unint.ernpt.ed ,.ace clJ.d no~ follow, but the AIlericaD. Minis­
ter 'l'h0BlA. c. O..,80D reported to St.ate Deparu.nt officials 
that revolutionary plotttat had abated beea••e of the inabil­
i ty of n'9'Olutionule. to plWl4er the collecUon po.ta. ae 
al.o reported that aqrloalture and cattle rai8ing were again 
flouri~iD9 and that, for the firat t.ime, public officials 
were recelv1nv their .alari•• on .ebedule.'4 
Onder aa.6a Cacere. (Pre.ident 1'06-1911), relation. 
wi t.h the Onited. Stat.. .ere haD\OD!ou.. ~cen. laspired l 
trua~ in hi. admiDi.tratlon by appoint.iBg able aen and 
in..iatuu, on hon••ty in goveX1lMDt. It was beeaWie of thi., 
iD part, that hi. pre.idenay "a. one of the fne.t., BlOat 
peaoeful, a4 con.t.nctJ..... ia the Republic·. hiat.ory. But 
Ilponi,! RelatiODB, or.cit., 1907, p. 357. 
94Xbid., 1905, p_ 379_ 
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at a tiae WIleR the tutue ....a brighte8t, Dca1DiCaDa were 
.tart.lea by the Dew. of Caceres' ......ination on November 
19, 1911. '.fhe country then fell into the banda of General 
Alfredo M. Victoria, COBIIlUder of the Republic'. ailituy. 
Being only twenty-six year8 old, he v.. Dot of conatitutional 
.,e to be PH.J.d.ent, but intl:ipea to .ecure the election of 
hi. uncle, B18dio Victoria. ~he 90..~nt va. quickly 
COIlWtrt.e4 into a 8tark ailitary dietat.oraMp and • 11\Dlbel: 
of leading political and atlitary leader. rai••d the stand­
ard of "volt aDd. OGoupie. parts of tbe nation fro. which 
they refused to be 4i8lodged. In Waabington the di8rup­
tiOD ca.t lIOn thaD • litt.le doubt upon the inf.llibility 
of the Rooseveltiall pnaorlpt.ioa for: ••int..inn9 the peace 
of the Carib_aD, and -rai••• the que.tiOll ot "bether ~ 
Mre control of cuatGlla wa. a cODclu.ive re.e4y for do.at.ic 
di..order...~S 
W••hingt.on at fir.t 8upported the 2! facto regime, 
.arniDg the revolutioniat.. that it "a. the practice of the 
United st.t.. -to refu.e to recogni.e any government re.ult­
ing fro. a revolution ~1e.. it. appear. to repre.ent the 
will of the people.u9' aevolutionary oppo.ltiOD. bowever, 
was too foraidab1e for W••hington to overlook, and wben it 
bec_ apparent after IIOftth. .)f figbtin9 that the atX1l991e 
9Sperkia•• !R_cit., pp. 254-55. 
91"~19! Bel.tiOG., gp.oit., 1912, pp. 341-42. 
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wa. a aeadlock, the United State. government offered its 
good offices with a view of re-establishing peace and order 
in the troubled aepublic.'7 
Acting on the recommendations of the American Minis­
ter to Santo Domingo, William W. Russell, who was up.et by 
the closure of interior customhous.s by the fight1n9,98 a 
speoial commission appointed by President Taft, oonsisting 
of Ceneral Prank Molntyre of the Bureau of Insular Affairs 
of the War Department and Mr. W.'1'. Doyle, Chief of the Latia 
Alaerican Division of the State Department, arri".d in Santo 
Domingo on october 2 to investigate the existing aituation. 
They were also acoompanied by 750 Marin •• , whose duty it 
wa. to protect the custollhou... , if it bec_ nece••ary to 
do so. 
Upon their arrival in Santo Domingo, the Commi••ioners 
aelvis.a the President, Bladio Victoria, to declare a general 
amnesty and remove i ___di.tely his nephew, General Alfredo 
Victoria, froa hi. duties .a Minister of War and Interior, 
and to co-operate pr08lptly with the Amerioan Minister 
Russ.ll 1D n ...tabli8hing to working order the interior 
cu.teahouse., and finally, -to make all other reforms ne.d­
fUl for the protection of ~.venue. and the re.toration of 
97wel1e., !I_cit., II, p. 697. 

98Munro , op.Gl~.t p. 261. 
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quiet and content throughout the Republic.-" At firat, 
Victoria .....4 willlng to ....nt to ~. -su9q••tion.- of 
the co-i••ionera, but later proved recalcitrant. 1ft the 
face of Victoria's .tubbonme•• , -the respons. of the Unitea 
Stat•• wa. that in view of ai.u•• of fund. in the pa.t, 
inat.ructi0ll8 would be given to the General Receiver of 
Doainican CUsto.. to oe.8e all payaent. to the e.tablisbed 
90"erzment.-100 In the .... vein, no revenue. wen to be 
9i'Nn to the rebel. and lilly go....nament ••tabli.bed by tb..­
would not be reoogni••d. Left virtu.lly pennil••• , Victoria 
re.igned on Bovaaber 26, 1912 and the DominioaD Congre •• 
•ettled down to electing • oandidate acceptable to the war­
ring faction•• 
On November 30, 1912 the Doainican Con9re•• elected 
the portly Adolfo Nouel, Archbi.bop of Santo Domingo, a. 
provisional pre.ident. The choiae of the aaiable Nouel 
brought an u..41ate ce••ion of bostilitie. and the ~rican 
Oo.mi••ionera, accompanied by the 750 Marine., left for the 
United State. witb the aituation apparently in hand. The 
9004 Archbishop, howe"er, w.. not of forceful charact.er, &l'ld 
after four IIODtha he retired to Buropc\r, collplaining of ill 
health. I'riet.ion bet.ween political faotion. cont.iDuea. to 
"Quoted in Well•• , op.cit., II, pp. 695-96. 
lOO.ilfrld Hardy Cal1cott, ~he Caribbean POliE! of 
the united. state., 1890-1920 (sal£llIO"1 JObn 10p1ii. pn88,
1,42), p. 2'1. 
61 
incre.se and by the end of March -the newly ins~alled 
Wilson administ.ration found an inextricable muddle onlits 
band., which Bryan, a. Secret.ary of State, proceeded to 
complicate by the worst possible appointments.·1Gl 
Informed Dominicans hoped for a chan,. in policy 
under the Wilson adainistration, as both Wilson and his 
Secretary of State Bryan were avowed ·anti-i.periali.t.•• • 
It seemed rea.onable to expect such a change, a. Wilson had 
announoed that the polioy of the United States toward Latin 
Aaerica would be one based on equality and that Washington 
viabed to bring into existence a spirit of .utual identifi­
cation and solidarity on the ba.ia of mutual appreciation • 
.Aa he hi_elf expressed itl 
What we deaire to do, and wbat we shall do, is 
to show Qur neig'hbors to the south of ua that 
their interests are ident.ical with our inter••uI 
that we ha.. no plans or any thoUfJhts of our own 
exaltation, but have in vie. only the peace and 
the prosperity of the people 1n our bemiephere.102 
Indead, when Wi180n·. administ.ration as.wae4 power 
·it would,· in the word8 of Dana C. Munro, ahave baen hard 
to fores.. tbat hie aciadniatration would go farther than 
any of its predeoessors in int.ananiag in the internal affaka 
of s.~ral west Indian republios.-103 
lOlKni9ht, 02.c1t., p. 51 

l02Quote4 ift ..lles, op.oit., II, p. 114. 

l03Mun~, 0R.oit., p. 269. 
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In theory, Wilson'. pronouno..ents were exceptional 
in view of past poliaiea, and created a favourable iapre.aiDa 
throughout Latin America. In fact, however, what w•• later 
produoed was a .eri.. of well-intentioned blunder. that led 
ultiaately to military ocoupation. A large .h.re of the 
blame tor early failure in the Dominioan Republic mu.t be 
placed on Seoretary of State Willi.. Jenning_ Bryan'. 
shoulders, a•• 
• • • the Secretary, while emotionally raapon­
.ive to the ideali•• of the theorie. eDunciated 
by President Wi180n, was incapable of qr••pin9
intellectually the .anner in ¥.bieb tho.. theories 
IIl1gbt be trans.uud into the daily rouUn. of 
hi. DepartMnt.. It. va. notoX'ioua that the great.
majority of the diplomatic appointee. .ent by the 
Wil.OD Administration to Latin &aerie. pos•••s.4 
no qualification for their taak other than that of 
loyalt.y to the Deaocratio puty. But nowhan • • • 
vas this ineptitude in the ••lection of agants to 
carry out the Wilson policy -.ore laMlltebly demon­
.trated than in the 8fpoiDt.lD8Dts lRade to the 
no.inican RepUblic.1
In defen•• of Pre.ident WilsOD it .ust be admitted, .. 
ChesteX' L. Jon•• not•• , that -the probleu which bera, •• 
els.where, coftfEOftted the wilson administration involved 
peculiar difflculti•• which it. i. not by .any ....a 8ura 
that a better-cho.en .et of official. could have overooae.~5 
Wh.n W1180n took office he found the DoaiDican Repub­
lic in turmoil. On April 14, the DoIIiniean Congre •• , .fter 
, 
two tortuous weeks of deliberation, elecuc.i Ger..ral Jo.. 
104.811•• , 02_cit., II, p. 717. 

l05Jone., oR.oit.., p. 111. 

IBorda. Vald•• a. provisional president for ODe y.ar. The 
nev president., failin9 t.o inspire confidenoe UlODC) all 
political factions, va. gn.ted by rebellion only on. day 
after hi. inaugurat.ion. ~be .ituation continued to decay, 
and by Septeaber the revolt had reaohed major proport.ion•• 
In the _anti.., Preaident. Wilson, on Secntary of St.ate 
Bryan'a reeo_nution, appointed a. Mini.ter to the strife­
ridd.n Republio, one J .... Mark Sullivan, wboa. only quali­
fication was that he bad baen a loyal aupporter of the De.....' 
oratic party.106 
After hia appointment Sullivan waa ordered to pro­
O8ed u.e41ately to Santo uoaingo and "aa inat.ruct.ed by 
S.cretary Bryan to infora the revolutionary leader. thet 
the influence of the UDit.ed State. gOvemMDtl 
•• • would be exert.ed for the support of lawful 
authoritiea in Sa.to Doaingo, and for the diacour­
g._at of any and all inaurnctiouary mathoda • • • 
~i that thia 90vernaeat would ..,ly afford legit­
tJu,t.e _ana to a.ai.t in the reat.oratioa of. order 
Del in the prevention of further in.urrect1ona, 
holding 1ta81f bound at all tt..a to advia. w1th 
the GoverDaeftt 1n beh.i570f t:boa. who 'eal that 
the,. ha.. a grievance. 
While .1'1 rout. to Santo 00.11'190, Hr. Sullivan rece1wd 
aDoth.r cOII1IWllcatioa from Secretary Bryan in which be .a. 
in.tructed to conv.y the followift9 .....V. to the rebel 
1.aa.~8 ift PU.~to Plata. The .....,. waxned the ~.volu-
lO'Knight, op.cit., pp. 35-54. 

l07poreil! Relationa, ae,cit., 1913, pp. 425-26. 
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tionui•• that., under the toenail of t.he 190' agl'8ell8llt, the 
United St.ata. would• 
• • • DOt con.ent. that. the DOII1Dlcan Govemment 
incre••e 1t. debt. for tbe purpo.. of payia! the 
revo1ut.ionary expens.. and c1ataa. • • • ADet 
.hould the revolution 8ucceed, th1. GoYemaent. 
would withhold recognition of the de facto ,0V8rn­
.anc, and ooll8aqueat1y withbold th8 porlIon of 
the austau collecUcm. be10ngiftg to Santo Doalago 
a. lCD9 aa -1wancopi••4 de facto 90verruaeat 
abould exiat. 08 --
Wben the above threat, col1taiDift9 certain featurea 
that did Dot .... to be covend by the t.reaty of 1907, taile4 
to end. bo.tJ.litle. between the Bordas 9ova:ru1ent. and the 
insurrectionist.., Seoretary Bryaa, actlDg on the Reo_da­
tion. of Miniater Sullivu, Bent three State Depart.D.t. offi­
clals and thlrty ...istant. to .upervise t.he Con9ra••lonal 
election. In December 1:0 ilUlu. a fair election. 'this act..icn, 
certainly DOt. provided for by the 1907 tn81:YI 
• • • CDD.titute. the firat evidence of formal 
intenentioD by the United stat..s in t.he intenal 
aff.in of the DoIIiaicaft ..public. • • • lind ab.olNd 
ail: '.1nor•••in9 4i.nt"4 for the .overeign r19ht.B 
iDherent. in 'the DoIdniaan people ¥hlGh led ine.­
itably to tile DliliHP' occupatioa of the Republic 
three year. later. 
The Wilaon a4llinist~atiollla effoJ.'ta for peace, vbile 
questionable, had thu far beea auoe•••ful. Evea critic. 
of Pn.ieSeDt Borda. had to ac1a1t ~at. the Dec"'~ election. 
were orderly and fair. Yet the oppOaition va. Dot a.tl.flad, 
108rorel1! "lations, 02.01t.., 1913, p. 421. 
10'.all•• , op.cit., XX, p. 726. 
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and political and economic CODditlon. within the island 
steadily wore_ned during the opening man~bs of 1914. At 
the be9inDln9 of 1'14 the Bord.s gOverDJl8Dt, through ais­
managa__at of fUDd. aDd because of large expenditure. u.e4 
to curtail revolutionary .otivity, owed $3'6,000 for back 
salari.s and over $740,000 in clai... CODgression.l .... 
bara threatened to cau._ abao. if their December .alari.s 
were not paid and it beo_ olear to the aute Depart.Jaent, 
after adYancinCJ the Bor4as AdaiDist.ratiOll $40,000, t.hat it 
auat once more ,ive consideration to the Dominioan 9Overn­
.entls need for a .i.eabie loan. 
Secretary DryaD. shC:JlJfin9 a d••ire to exerci.. • 4egne 
of control 0..1' the intemal affaire of the Republic, instn.cbo 
a4 MiDistar Sullivan to .uIge.t to Bordas that $1,200,000 _f 
the 1'07 bonda, up to tlds t1lle d••tined for expenditure 1ft 
the area of public work., could be sold to pay back .alaries 
and pre••ing clat.a,OD the condition that aloohol and tobaoco 
taxes be increa.ect to rei_ur.. the public work. Iud, and 
em the further .tipulation that an American finucial expert 
be sent to Santo Doa1n90 to ...ist in ..ttars of account­
ing aDd budgetary oontrol with a view of helping officials 
to prevent a deficit. Bordas aocepted this propoaal when 
it w•• a9~..4 that the aua would be inc~e•••d to $1,600,000, 
bu.t Bordas' eneal•• in Congre•• blocked the ....ur. un1:il 
April, in order to cawae hill financial embarra•••nt. It .. 
fi"ally anaDged that the -financial expert.- would be at:ta::-.s 
'6 
to the CllstoJUI nceiverahlp ue! that he would po••••••OM 
deqree of power in connection with the g-ove~t's finan­
cial administration.110 Charle. M. Johnston, a coapatent 
lUll with experieace in Mexico and t.he west lAdies, wa. 
selected by President Wilson to fill the poaltlon. 
By now Wl1.on w.a watchin, the deteriorating political 
.ituation with ql."OWing cOIlcern. III Aug-ust he assumed more 
dir.ot control by applying to the DoIlinicaa Republio the 
·Wilson PleA.- Wilsoa'. plan reaffirmed the altruistic pur­
pos•• of the United State. but declared that if coa.tructi.. 
benefits vere to aeone to the DoII.inioaD naUon, the firat 
order of busines. va. to balt all armed bostilities. This 
done, he then .ufte.tad that t.he political leaders ohoo.. 
a proVisional pre.ident who would then arrange for elections 
for both the Presidency and COnqrea.. The elections wou14 
be .upervi.ed by Aaerican ob••rYera to lnaun fairne.. an4 
Wa.bington would then rec09fti... the .1.cted,v90vemaent a. 
one repre••nting- the people'. wi.h... Once the goverlUl8Dt 
a.su.-d office, no further revolutioas would be pera1t:ta4 
by the unit.ed St&tfa.. All cban,es were haAceforth to be 
made via the COnstitutional route. lll W1leon's plan .....4 
to follow and ...n exceed the .arlier dictate. of Secretary 
Dryu, for the .pealal comai.s1onera appointed by 're.idant 
110,orel,ft Belatioos, op,cit., 1914, pp. 236-37. 
1111',
";Jbid., pp. 247-48.
-
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Wilson. t.o ••acute his p18l1 in Sant.o DoIIiDgo ".re inst.ructed 
thu,ly,i ·.0 opport.unity for uguaent ahould be 9iven to 
, / 

\ ,/ 

any per.on or faction. It i. desired that you pre••nt the 
plan and ... that it i. oomplied with.·112 According to the 
.st.te Su.nel.' well••• 
President Wilson t.plied that the 90ver.a.ent of 
the Inited St.t•• po••••••d the right to ...ure 
it.elf of the continuaao. of orderly oon.tltu­
tioaal g.".m.ent in t.he DomiDic.. ..public, and 
would ·'••1 .t liberty· to pr.".Dt all chap. in 
the Qo".~t of the DoII1nicaa Republic other 
Chu thos. by 'the ·pe.a.fullifO" •••• • provided in 
the Dominioan Con.titutlon. 
Wllson·. co_i.aioun, the foraer Go"ernor of Mew 
Jer..y, ftaDltl1n 'on, aDd Charles Sa1th, • New R.mp.hlre 
attomey, .ecur.d acoeptance of the Wilson .1_ from all 
the principal le.ders except Desiderio Arias. nere1lpOn, 
/ ,
Pre.ideat Bord.. Hsigned and a phy.ioian, Dr. ....n BU., 
a soa of BuenaYeDtura B.e., Who bad n4W8r active1y eD,aged 
1a politic., was .lected Provi.lonal Pre.ide.t on Aug••t 
. ,
27, 1914. .ollowing hi. inauguration, 're.ident ••e., 
after consult.ing with the United St.t•• Ca.a1••ioaers, .1.'­
ranted for natlonal elect.ion. for: a Pre.ident od • C0ft9re­
to be beld in .ix weeks. It waa al.o .gree4 that. the elec­
tion. WOuld be ob.erved by Aaerioan repre.ent.atl".. to in... 
f.il'll•••• 
fte principal clIDdiaat.ea wen of the two historic 
112Ibid., p .. 247. 

113 -
.ell•• , op.oit., II, p. 738. 
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I!:!!.' aDd Boracio V••que_ the Horaci.taa. The electlon. t.ook 
place Oft October 25 and ...sultee! in a naZ'1'OW "ictory for 
Ji_ne.. It _to be noted, however, that. the Jta*ua force• 
..de ~ t.portaat political deal. which In.area victory. 
one va. vith • thlrd party oandidate, Federlco Velaaque., 
wbo v.. persuaded. to throw bi. 'tOtal .upport. t.o J1Mne. In 
return for control of 2S per cent of the job. 1.11 the DeW 
9ove~t, and the other w•• wlth Desiderio Arias who, tor 
hl••upport, wu proais" • cabinet po.ltion. secretary 
Bryan, col1v1aa.d \:be elec1:1oD. bad represent.eel t.be vill of 
the people, ueland Oft ROYGlber 14, 1914 that. 
Tbe per10d of re'VOlut.1on. 1s p••t, law and order 
wll1 De sl1pported, a.c••••ry nfo.J:IU will be u.r98d 
through 189islatiOA. It i8 believed that \U.'lder 
.ach • policYl"aoa vill be followed by pro.perity 
and PX'09ns•• 
Por a fleeting __nt, lt .....d u lf the tlny natlon 
would enter upon an .ra of peace ud pro.parity, but the 
IIn.iat.ance of the State Departaent that J1JI1Iiaell place the 
collection of .lat.enal revenue. under the neeiverahip ..4 
9iveCharle. M. John.toD, tbe ·f1Aanaial expert,· offlcial 
nCogIlitioD .. GODtxoller, .oon broW)bt revolt once more 
t.o the Latin "public. 'fhe s'tate Departaent felt that ~ 
tic refo~ were n••ded if 4eaoOracy vere to flouri.h anc! 
~t the area which ...484 the .,.t at.lenUoD v•• the ada1n­
114poreil! Relation., !lecit., 1914, p. 256. 
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tetration of government finance.. Such. proposal wa. Dot 
ea1au1ated to oa... much furor a., during and after the elec­
torial O_pe190, .uhiogton had r••i".4 a••urancee in 
writiag fso. 3i.. I e. aDd the ot.ber oaDdi4ate. tbat t.bey 
wen in favor of placing the intemal raYeD..... under the 
netoma receivership.llS 
That rafoD was needed cannot be denied. Barlier 
loan. to Al'chlDl.hop Noue1 haa. been squaIlc1ered. in suppres­
.ing "-.olt., and short-tent loan. approved for .arioua 
projeot. had beea ai.u.ea and intereat paymeats were long 
overdue. To add to thi. finucial mi.ery, there were prac:­
tical1y ao tax receipt. available to the q09a~t a. the 
Bordas adaini.tretion bad per.uaded ..rebant. and 1nduatr1­
aliet. to pay their taxes in advanoe in retarn for a reduced 
rate. Preaideat Ji.bw••aa also confronted with an Ariaa 
clominated auiat and ·atuapt. at refora had no further 
result than to stiaulat. violent oppo.ition••116 .a41y, 
Pre.idliBt. ' "i_Il•• j. ,now aged aDd 1nfixa, contributed to the 
deterioratioD of 1:he aitaation througb hi. lack of anergy 
in adopting stroDg me.aura•• 
It va. in Pebru&1'J' 1'15, ollly a ..ek after the Pr••i­
deBt'. inaquration, that Seoretary Bryan, ••ekinq to enlaqe 
in ecope hie ult1uce policy of .....tin' the ult,1mate dec1aial' 
115M\mro, !R.ait.., p. 2'1_ 

116Sc:hoenrioh, !2.ci~., p. 90. 
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ragar4ing tbe domestio poliei.s of the Doainioan Government 
in the hands of representative. of the United State., in-
Iforaed Pr••ident Jimenez that ha was expeoted to extend tor­
aal reC09nit.ioll to Mr. Charl•• M. Johnston, wilsOD'. appoin­
tee .a ·financial expert,· a. Comptroller of the Finances 
of the Dominican aepublic, and that hi. duties would be tOI 
• • • provide .. bud9at for the Dominican Republic
baaed upon hi. knowledge of ineome and probable
expenditure., thia budget to be ri9idly adhered to, 
to approve and counteraign any payments aada by the 
Dominican Govemaant, it being Wlderstood that no 
paymenu be va.li4. unl••s countersigned by the Comp­
troller. ll7 
In ad4ition, internal reveaue w.a to be plaoed under the 
recelverahip and public works were to be put under an Ameri­
can, accountable only to the Unit.ed State. State Depara.nt. 
It va. alao augge.ted that United Stat.a as.istance be 0" 
taioea for organizing a conatabulary offic.red by United 
States peraonnel that would replace the Dominioan Army. Tbe 
latter .tep waa aean a. one that would irrevocably put an 
end to political diaturbance. 
When Ji~ne. attempted to obtain the approval of the' 
DOIIinican Congre.. to Secretary Bryan'. propo.ed _aaur•• , he 
was treeted by at1ff OPPOSition from the Hoxacist. Senatora 
aDd from the cronies of Arias. Aria. argued against tollow­
int united States dictate., but it w•• gen.rally recogni••d 
117poreii! Relationa, 0e.c1t., 1915, p. 297. 
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that his opposition. 
• • • was due to the fact that the President 
waa unable to incr.... the subsidy which he had 
already cODman.ad to pay him and was unwilling to 
c.~ry out all of Arias' 4-t1re8 with ~9ard to 
goveromentalappointments. 
Jimenez feebly pre••ed for acceptance of Washington'. 
propo.al that Johnston be given official r.cognition aa 
controller, but when the Dominican Congress twice refused 
hi. request, he took the position that Johnston could have 
no legal authority. The State Department was determined to 
atand firm, bowevaJ:', and lnai.ted that Johnston continue to 
counteraign all checks covering governmental expenditures. 
Aa a result, -th_ status quo continued for 80me montha, witb 
constant friction between the controller and the President 
and with little beneficial effect on the Republio's financDl 
aituation.- ll9 
State Department officials were a180 disappointed in 
their hope that a freely elected government would lead to a 
quieting of internal unrest, for simultaneous with Congres. 
sional unre.t was the threat of an armed in.urreotion by 
IQuirico Weliu, the Governor ot Puerto Plata. Acting on 
, 
reports that linked the .coUllarel Arias with Feliu, Secre­
tary ot State aryan instructed the AIlerican Minister Sulli-
I 
va to •••ure JiMna. of continued 8upport and to intorm 
ll8W• ll•• , oe.cit., II, pp. 749-50. 

l19Munro , op.cit., p. 297. 
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the dissident leader. that they would be held personally 
responsible for any attempt they might make to embarrass 
the government. In his cable to Sullivan, the Secretary of 
State further stated thatl 
This Government means what it ••id when it sent 
a commis.ion there with a proposal looking to 
permanent peace and it will live up to the pro­
mis.s it has made. • • • !he changes advised B.e. 
the reforms d.aandem are the reforms necessary for 
the honest and .fficient administration of the 
Government and the early and proper development of 
the country. There should be no unnece.sary delay,
therefore, in putting them into operation.. • A 
naval force will be sent whenever necea.ary.l~O 
Ultimately, the threatened revolt in Puerto Plata was headed 
off, but it need be noted that negotiations only became 
successful when the U.S.S. Castine anchored in the harbor 
off Puerto Plata with a large body of American Marines 
aboard. 
A problem of a different nature aroa. in April when 
Sullivan reported that the Dominican Congress had initiated 
,
impeacbaant proceedings against President Jimenez for his 
failure to dismiss Johnston as oontroller. Congressional 
hostility toward Johnston was activated by his decision to 
auspend payment on a number of superfluous budgetary ite.a 
aubmitted in March by the Dominican Senate and by the; atteapt 
of Clarence H. Baxter, the General Receiver, to set up a 
civil service system within the receivership. The need for 
the Dominican Government to live Within its income was 
l20poreigft Relations, 0e.ait., 1915, pp. 279-80. 
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appareft~ to informed Ob.er.era, .. vaa the need for a more 
orderly arrange.ant within the receivership, but Congre.s 
had twice refused JohDaton'. appoint..Dt and stood on fira 
,
Constitutional ,round in it. attack against Jimenez for his 
failure ~o follow Con,re••lonal 4ictat... Secretary of 
State Bryan, upon nceiving' word of the proceeding. and 
t:be report tha~ certain _8lbera of th. Doainioan Congre•• 
hoped to in.tall Ari.. a. Provi.ional Pre.i4en~, i..-diately 
instructed Sullivan to infora tho.. involved that .a.hington 
would I1Ot • 
• , •• pera1t any attaok to be ..de upon Pre.ident 
Jt.jne. for acting in good,faith toward. the United 
State. • • • p...ident J1..ne. • • • ia entitled 
to aDd vil1 receive from this Goveraaeat any a ••ia­
taJaca that w1ll be necea.ary to OO1Ip8l reapect for 
hi. "".lniat.ratloD. ni. 8upport will. be ,ivan 
whether the attack. -.d8 UPOllabi. ue direot or 
indinct, opeD OJ:' in .ecret.l 1 
The Secretary of S1:ate'.....aga had t.mediate effect 
aD the Dominican Congre.. and !apeachaent proceeding. againat 
IJiMne. ware, for the t1ale being, abandoaed I but a danger­
oua aoura. of policy had. been ••t into motion, foJ:' Secr_ 
tHy Bryan had ooap1.te1)' ignored the r4CJht of lapeaom.nt 
given the Doainican Congre•• by the Dominioan Constitution 
and -had pa••ed the .ta9& when he con.i481.'ed t.bat the 4mea­
tic affain of the DoIIiniaan "public were other than a 
ut.tar for t.be 801e ctet.end.natlon of the DepartMnt of s...~ 
l21pozeil! Belationa, op.cit.., 1915, pp. 283-.4. 
122..11•• , !Reoit., II, p. 752. 
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The oontrovez.y whieb involved United State. control 
over the appointmant of all c.-tams officials va. .ettled 
IICr_ amicably by a Dominica oa.li••iOll whioh _t with 
Pr.sident WilsOD and Secretary Bryan in the latter part 
of April. They were .amly 9reete4, and although the State 
Departaent .too4 fira in iD8i.tiD9 on adhennce to the 01:'i9­
inal lt07 agreement whiob 9aYe the. ultiaate power ovar the 
appoiD~t of cu.toaa peEsonnel, theyt 
• • • .oupt to _et the DoIliIlicaD' s objections 
to JoIm.~n by traa.forriD. to the ouato_ neeiv­
er.bip .oat of the dutie. of the controlloE. John­
.t:on hi...lf vu to have a po.t in the recei".rahip, 
:!~4-:0;n::r;::::!i:l-:::l::;~; :::t~..o::t:!:iI3 
Rot _pectin, .uoce••, the Doa1nlcaa C~••io_l:'. vere 
pl....d wit.h the ne" arraageaent and .ailed for Santo DoIIda­
CJO to celebrate one of their few 41p1omatic viaunr1e•• 
A8 the au.aer~:of 1'15 approaohed there vere 819D1fl­
cant ahU988 ..de in State Department peraonnel. In May, 
Sullivan waa compelled to r ••i9D and in June, Secretary of 
State aryan turned over the rein. of leader.hip to Robert 
LaDsing_ As early a. Deoembe~ 1914, president Wil.on had 
been informed of oertain iaproprieti.. on the p~rt of Sul­
livan and had appolated Senator J .... D. Phelan of Cali­
fornia to In....t19'.t.. the allegatlons. Tbe pn.. 1188dl.. 
ately be,aR to .xplore the ch.r,e. a,.inst. Sullivan and 
123MuRro, op.cit., p. 301. 
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.0 damaged hi. image that any credibility be might have 
had was soon loat. The coup 2! irace waa delivered when 
Senator Phelan releaaed hia finding. on Nay 8, 1915. Sum­
marizing hi. report, the Senator took into account an 
a1l8,8d bribe wbich wa. offered to a State Department offi­
cial who had inve.tigated Sullivan'. iaproprietie•• 
I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doUbt 
that Mr. Sullivan fully realiz.d the gro.s•••• of 
the impropriety of hi. proposition, but I aa sat­
isfie4 because of hi. propoSition that he i. not 
a PZOD4U: penon to hold the position that be doe. 
hold.124 
Sullivan haa remained at hi. po.t for over four months 
before hi. resignation, and on••u.t agree with Dana G. 
MUnro'. stat.ment tbat it was indeed -extraordinary that the 
American government should have atteapted for .everal month. 
to deal witb so potentially dangerouB a situation throuqh 
a repre.entative who vas completely diaeredited.- l25 
During the summer of 1915 the political atmosphere in 
the Dominican Republic once again bec... charged. Local 
rebellions by di.affected provincial l.ader. flared anew aDd 
by July an insurrection b••de., by General ••n6n OYaodo in 
the Province of San hd:r:o de Macori. tbreat.eaed to engulf 
the tiny ..public in revolutl~D. At this juncture, Pr••lcieIE 
Ji_nez suffered a pbysical and mental breakdown and w•• 
oblipd to turn the rein. of governmental control over to bill 
l24ouoted in Kni9bt, 22.c1t., p. 65. 

l25Munro, gp_cit., p. 301 
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sharply divided cabin.~. Senaing the a.riousn••• of the 
aituation, Secretary Lansing instructed the American Charge 
d' Aff.ires on July 21 to infora tho•• principally involved 
in the diaturbances that if i~ "'0_ necessary to land 
AMerican 801diers to establiab order be would no~ b.81~.te 
, 
to do 80. General Boracio Vaaquez, •• leader of the oppos1­
tioD, quickly •••erted his party's d.sire for peace, but in 
an open me..... to Lansinq h. declared that. 
I believe that the peace of the country o.n 
be firmly established not by troops but throuqb 
good and respected institutions•••• MOreover, 
I do not believe that preaident Wi180n haa the 
right, under any pretext., to infringe the aov­
areiqnt.y of an indepeDdent. people ••• I oonsider 
aa indispensable both re.pect for public liber­
ti.. and for the l.w on the part of the Govern­
ment iD19fder to attain the enda wbich we 80 much 
desire. 
The situation remained tOUChy until the Fall montha when 
,
Ji..aea once again resumed his post and quieted the revo­
lutionary l.adera by distributing among th.. numerous road 
building contract. and appointments to positiona within 
the government. Politically, tbe aituat.ion waa, for the so­
_at, in hand but such a ·we.k and teaporizin9 policy· could 
only le.d to future diffioulti.a. 127 
The chan,e. in State DepartaeDt personnel had, for • 
fle.t.ing ., .. nt., given ria. to speculation &IIOng Dominicus 
126Qgotea in ••11•• , oe.cit., II, p. 756. 
l27:roreie Relationa, 0e_cit., 1915, pp. 292·95. 
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that ~rican foreign policy adg'ht be 80ftenad to allow the 
Dominican government more le.way in her cOD9res.ional 
activiti•• and that the Convention of 1'07 might be reinter­
preted so a. to give Dominicans more ~ontrol over eXp8ndi~ 
tur... Dominican. soon found out, however, that a1thoug'h 
a chang'e had occurred in American repre.entation, there was 
to be DO chanqe in American policy, indeed, Secretary of 
State Lan.ing .ouqbt -to re.ffi~ the policy gradually .aul­
ded by Secretary Bryan with the at l ...t tacit approval of 
Pre.ident Wil.on, • • • (!nd undert.oo~ to obtain for the 
Uaited Stat•• an eYen greater ...sure of oontrol._128 
Becaus. of the continuing di.order withi. the Republic 
and the fe.ling among many State Department officials that 
financial direction of Dominican affairs W&8 neces.ary to 
prevent recurriDq revolutions, Seoretary Lansing ia Sept... 
beX' iasu-ucted William w. au••ell, the new Allerican Mini.tar, 
to iafora the DoIdnicen Government that 1tva. increa.inC] 
ita public debt in violation of the 1907 Convention. aua.ell 
waa also told to convey the fact to the DoaiaicaD Government 
that $7,000,000 dollars of public indebtedn••• had been 
CIOntzaoud without united States approval and that if the 
original object. for which ~e COnvention had been secured 
we~e to be upheld future violation. of the Treaty could not 
be allowed. In cODDection with Secretary Lansing'••tatement 
l2Iwell•• p op.cit., II, p. 758. 
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it auat be reaeabere4 that in July the neighbori., repub1io 
of Baiti had been placed under United States ailitary occu­
pation. The ocaupatioD of Haltlwou1d bave far reach1n, 
consequences for Dominicans fori 
• • • the ..Itate DepartaeJlt'. 14... of what OU9ht 
to be done UD the Doadnlcan 1lep\1b1iil took delinite 
ahape after tbe intervention in Sait.i forced the 
American gOYerDment to formulate a relatively 4e'­
inite program tor that cOUDtry. '!'be provis1ons of 
the treaty with aaiti bad their origin largely in 
the State Depart.ent's experieace in Santo Domin,o, 
ad tbe ..in feat.ures of the treat.y now bec_ 
abjectlye. of Amerioan policy in that cOUDtry.13t 
What Lanalng hoped for was the adoption of a new oon­
vention which would be similar to the one recently conoluaed 
with aaiti; with p~viaiODs for a land aurvey to facilitate 
taxation, for a oonstabulary he.ded. by Americans, for a 
core of Aaerioan engineers to ovane. public works and SaD­
ltation, and for the approYal of a finucia1 advi.er "ho 
would have the ultiaat. deci.ion in budgetary .attera. If 
an." treaty ,could not be aecured, Lansing instructed aua­
••11 to aelYi.e the Doat.nican fovel'l'll8ent that under the teru 
of the 1907 ConY.atioa the UDite4 Statea had the 1e9al right 
tol (1) oa.pel the ob••rYation of Article III of the con­
ftDtion ill the appointDmt of a fiDaBcia1 advi••r and, (3) to 
provide for the free coura. of oustoms by the cre.tioD of 
• con.tabulary.l30 
l2'Munro, 02. ait., p. l02. 

ll0PoreifD Relationa, 22,01t., 1915, pp. 321-25. 
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Doaialcan governmental leadera almost unanl.ou.ly 
rej.cted the thou9ht of ratlfy1nq eo odious aD agreement 
a. had been aocepted by Halti and protested vehemently ; 
against WaahiDfton'. interpretation of the 1907 COnvention. 
Lansing, for the time being, dld not pres. for acceptance 
of a new treaty but dld insiat on DoaiDlcan acceptance of 
a financial adviaer aDd the creatlon of • Constabulary. 
UDder such cirauaatance. Jt.ene.' po.ltioD •• Pr••ident waa 
particularly preoariou.. On the one .1de, Arias w•• con­
.tantly intrlgu1Dg again.t the ailin9 executlve in the hope. 
of r.placing hi. a. Provisional pre.ident, and although 
,
Ji..... did po..... a coterie of loyal and abie official. 
be n.eded financial •••istance in the form of loan. to main­
tain hl.·- ada1niatration. 'fhi. the stat. Departaent was un­
willj.nC] to allow unl••• th.ir &tauds re,ardin9 the Conven­
tion of 1907 wer. _t. 
Bv.nt. c... to • head on April 14, 1'16. With the 
aid of the vel'aque. faction in his Cabi••t, J~Dez co.... 
aitted himaelf to a cour•• of actian d••igned to l ••••n 
the bfl••noe of Aria., who at. the t.ime was Minister of 
War. General c..area Jim6n.z, Chi.f of the Ratio_l Guard, 
and Qeneral Mauricio JiMBea, Co.aan4er of the forces .ta­
t.ioaed in the capital, "1:'. aaa.oned to • aMIl .at.at. a 
f.w .tle. froa the capital vbere they w.re arrested for 
disloyalty to the gov.rnmeat an. for venality iD their 
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offlcial dutles. Aria. was also summoned for an interview 
,
with Jimenez, but was alerted to the fact that hls chief 
lieutenaata wer. under arrest. Believing iacarearatioD 
awaited hlm, ha h••ded for the fortre.s in Santo Domingo 
where be ahut himself up w1th troopa loyal to hls person. 
withln a abort time the remainder of the arR¥ along with the 
aajor opposition parties declared for Aria.. Hoping to bead 
off a general rabellioa:, the American Mird.ster SullivUl 
joined with Archbisbop Houel in an effort to reach some ~ 
of cOilpromis. with Ari... Unfortunately for all parties 
CODoarDea, no aqr....nt va. reached. By May 1, it was rec­
ognized that the break between Arias and Jtmenez was a per­
.anent one. Contrassional allies of Arias lmpeacbed Jl~ 
and he in turn d1sl11.sea Arias froa hi. Cabinet position. 
In a rare display of aecislven.ss, J~nea collected 
about ht. 1500 troops which wer. supplied by ProviDclal 
governor. stll1 loyal to hi. and marched to the outskirts 
of Santo Doaingo where he ..nt envoy. to Aria. 4e.an4inq 
bi. t..8dlate surrender. Fearinq a po.sible ..iaure of the 
Presidency by the Germanophile Arlas, Secretary Lansing 
I
urged Jia8nez to reque8t the •••istance of United states 
MariDes who haa conveniently stationed th....lv.. in Santo 
Domingo harbox aboard the u.s.s. Prairie aDd the U.S.S. 
Castine. ~be DoaiDioaD executive at first ••emed will1nq 
to auaaon AaerioaD Marines, but after considerable debate 
he concluded that the Doa1nlcan people would oppose foreigD 
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tcoopa on their 80il and modified his position by a.~in9 
only for arma and ammunition for hi_ troops. In a decislon 
which aut be qua_tJ..oned, Lansing inforaed the American 
I 
Minister that Jimenez must re.triot hia8elf to ••king only 
for the support of American troops. 
In the Mantiae, American Marin.s were landed osten­
sibly to protect the Asarican Legation and the Haitian 
.Le9ation, which wu serving a8 a refuge for fOl:e19ners. 
IJ1aenaa Meided to pr.s. the attack, but a shortage of 1li1i­
tarr supplies prevented h1. taking the capital. Row totally 
".ponden~t be .eked tbe American forces to take the city tor 
him, but within a ..ttar of hour. he withdrew this request 
and resigned. l3l By reaignin9, he hoped to .scape re.pon.i­
bility for the ever growing number of Marine. being landed 
without his peZ1ll1tJsion. In an addre.. to the nation he, 
announoed that, 
••• 1 .01....1y declare that I hold the sonaw­
ful 008910tion Chat an azaad eDcounter between ., 
force., thos• .00 are upftol41Dg the Constitution, 
and tho.. vbiab occupy t:he rebel stronghold of the 
CApital of Santo DoIBiD90 would inevltably bring 
as • re.ult ~:\,hWli1i.tloD of a Worth Aa8r1can 
intenention. • • • since the authors of the lIUP 
do' atat • • • wen dJ..po••d to destroy the lIa· on 
i'atliiF'"th&n renounce their lust for power, the 
P••idut. "u forced to _1eet. ODe of t.wo alterna­
ti...... e1ther 'to retu:n to the Pre.ide.tial Man­
slon _n9 rub. to enjoy a power rtl9aiDed for bJ.a 
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by foreign bulleta, or hi. OVD iaInolation•••• 

with the whole country at my aide •• • f with­

draw to the .erenity of a tranquil home. 32 
Instead of preventing furt:her~ American military inter­
vention, J~n.z' resignation resulted in an increaae in 
the nWllbar of troops .tationed outside the aapital. CongJ:ee­
aional leadere loyal to Arias were alarmed at the pres.noe 
of American force. so near the capital and aent the follow­
in9 ....age to President wils01l1 
'!'he transport 'nirie baa auived w1th troopa, 

but the oo.tDican people ha.. confideaae that 

the•• troops will not be uBed by any ..ana to 

iIluden with the free aation of ow: institu­

tions. 'fhe Leg-ialat1ve Power of this country i. 

respon.ive to the a_a. ot the whole 00WltJ:y and 

cla1.. fut~3re.ponsibility for its institutions 

and lawa. 

athttr Frateata follawed but wen of no avail, a. the nWlber 
of "rine8 was incre...4 .till further with the 8rrival of 
Rear AcJairal W.8. Caperton aboard the U.S.S. Dole!!in. 
IODce Jt.eDe.' re8i9nat10n appeared final secretary 
Laa.ill9 ext.eAded tul1 control to JUniatar .....11 as to what 
aotioa.s ahould be taken and •• to bow AMricu troop. ware 
to be ueel. Con.tit.utionally, execut.i". power reJU.J.ae4 in 
the hucl. of :.:the cabinet u.ntil • D_ Preaident .as chosen, 
therefore, Ruu&~ll deci4ad ~o recogni•• ita authority. In 
ConjllDct.iOD with his recotnition of the Doadnioan Cabinet 
132Ji~•• ' proclamation of May 7, 1'16 i. quote4 
in .alle., ge_cit_. II, pp. 7"·70. 
l33Quote4 in .elle., OR_cit., IX, p •• 771. 
83 
Russell also resolved to clear the capital of the rebels 
under the command of Arias. He instructed Caperton to take 
the necessary action and on May 13th the Admiral advised 
Arias that the United States would support the constituted 
authorit.y of the Republic and that if the revolutionaries 
had not surrendered Santo Domingo by six o'clock on the 
morning of the 15th, American forc•• would move to disarm 
the insurgents. Fortunately, Arias avoided bloodshed and 
on the night of May 14th moved hi. troops to the interior. 
The next morning Caperton's forces entered Santo Domingo 
and a military ocoupation was proclailled. Proclaiming the 
capital occupied, Caperton addre••ed the following message 
to its citicensl 
I. OWing to the conditions that have existed 
in and uound this City in ooa.equaee of the 
fact that rebels in arms have taken possession of 
the City, exolud.tnq therefrOJa the Constitutional 
officials of the Government, and att.er all means 
te arri". at. a peaceful ••tt.l_ant. of the situ­
ation had been exhausted, it beoame necesaary to 
have the City occupied by forc•• of the United 
States of America. 
II. Notiee is hereby given to the oitizens of 
Santo Domingo that the foroes ot the United States 
of America have assumed oontrol of this City. 
III. All the inhabitants are requested to stay 
in the City and cooperate with me and ray repre­
sentatives in protecting life and property and 
maintaining order. 
IV. All public Officials are ask.allY re••in 
at their posts and cooperate with me. 
134pOreign Relations, 0R,.oit., 1916, p .. 228. 
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Dominican. were naturally resentful of the American pre.enoe 
in Banto Domingo and became somewhat hostile when Caperton 
ordered the principal oities of the interior occupied as 
we11. 135 Little did Dominicans know that this was only 
the first step in an occupation that would last a full 
eight years. 
In the eyes of many Dominicans, Arias had baen dis­
credited by hi. cowardly exit from Santo Domingo, but this 
did not keep the Congress from attempting to .ecure his 
eleotion as President. With the troubl.a()m8 interior al..t 
occupied, the Amerioan Minister Rua••11 decided the time 
was propitious to press for the reforms that the state 
Department had for 80 long advocated. To implement the 
long sought after reforms, however, Russell had first to 
block the election of Arias. ae -suggested- to the Domini­
can Congress that they delay their ohoice of a Provisional 
President until more normal conditions prevailed within 
the Republic. The Dominican legislators, however, refueea 
to adjourn, but being realists in an occupied country, they 
decided the election of Arias would be wholly unpractical 
and immediately started the search for a compromise candi­
date. 
On May 23rd, both the Houae of Deputies and the Senate 
had agreed on the aelection of Dr. Pederico uenr!quea y 
135poreiin Relations, op.cit., 1916, p. 227. 
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Car'lVajel a. Provisional 're.iclent. Ru•••l1 and Caperton, 
however, .oved co prevent final aotion on hi. nomination. 
They did .0 beea••• of hi. friendship with Arias and becau.e 
he refu••d to enter into any pre_laction .gr....nt. which 
would guarantee Waebington the latitude in policy which 
so many ~ ranking State Department official. were a••an­
diD9_ Ru•••ll .uggested to Washington that .ome of the 
lIOn .ilitant S.nators be p1aoed under arrest in order to 
block the elecUon of HenrIque.. Wa.hington vetoed Rua.el!s 
.Q9geatioa aDd in.tructed hi. to infor. the Contre.. that 
any ua.ati.factory gov.rnment would not be aooorded recog­
nition, 84 that DO austo.. reV.Due. would be released for 
it. uinbmuH. Independ.ntly of au••ell's action, the 
,
COUnoil of Mini.t.r., UDder the leader.bip of Vela.quez, 
inoarc.ratecl aeVeD of Aria.' aupporter. in aD atte.pt to 
.u.. off t:be eleotioD of .. Boraeiata aa Pn.iden't. Ra­
••11 i_cU.ately obt.ained ~ir nlea•• , but &enrtque. 
thought the plot had been instigated by the Unit.d State. 
to threateD the Dominican Cong-re... Henrique. va., bow....r, 
.hrewd enough to oosprehend the fate which await.d hi. a. 
Pr••i4en~ and in a .....,. to the people he declin.d the 
Pre.id.ntial nomiDation and hurled &bUB.. at the United 
State. for iaterlering in Dominioan politic•• 
With Henrique. out of the renint', the DOminican 
S••ate BOv.d quickly to .ecure th. election of Jacinto de 
C••tro, aD 014 follower of Gen.ral vuquea. ft. Bou.e of 
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Deputi•• , however, blocked hi••lec~ion because of hi. 
affiliation with the Horaeiate party, and once more a dead­
lock wa. produced. In the meantime, the occupation of the 
Cibao became complete with the surrender of Arias at San­
tiago on July 6th. In a •••a,8 to the Doainican people 
Caperton deolared that. 
It is no~ the intention of the United states 
Government to acquire by oonquest any territory 
in the DoIdJlican Republic nor to attack ita 80V­
ereignty, but our troops will remain here until 
all revolutionary ao....nt. have been atamped 
out and until such reforms as are deemed nece.aary 
to insure the future welfare of the country haYQ 
been initiated and are in effective operation.~l6 
By July's end the Dominican Conqress aqreed on the 
eleotion of ex-Pr••ident Archbishop Nouell. Houell, however, 
even thouqh a••ured of Russell's support, declined the nom­
ination. By constitutional limitation Congress was due to 
adjourn on July 26th. Rather than leave the aelection of 
a Proviaional President to a council of Ministers friendly 
to the United State., the legislators, without consultin9 
RUBsell, elected Dx. Francisco Henr!quez y Carvajal, the 
brother of Dr. Federico Henr!quez y Carvajal, aa Provisional 
President for a period of five months. HenrIquez ha4 for 
the past twelve year.,ieolated himself from Dominican poli­
tics by taking up residence in Cuba. Although his sympa­
thies lay with the Jimenista party, Dominican leaders felt 
l36porei92 Relations, o-.cit., 1916, pp. 231-32. 
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he would be acceptable to Washington. Hope soon turned to 
dismay, however, as Russell, unable to obtain any pre­
election promises, was instructed to withhold official reo­
ognition until the new President-elect consented to all of 
Washington's demands for reform. 
Upon arriving in Santo Domingo, aenrLquez was informed 
by Russell that the United States would not recognize his 
government unless he acquiesced in the interpretation of 
the Convention of 1907 a8 outlined in earlier notes to 
,
President Jimenez. Without any further attempt to resolve 
differences at the confexenoe table, Russell received ins~ 
ctions to suspend all payment of Dominican revenues. Wash­
ington's actions in this matter, while reprehensible, were 
designed to demonstrate to Henriquez that the United States 
could and would a.sume and maintain a rigid posture until 
its demands were met. The immediate effect, however, waa 
that Henriquez became intransigent and government employe.a 
and local merchants found it difficult to maintain them­
••lves without funds. ll7 
Henr!quez remained firm, arguing that the Dominican 
Constitution did not give him power to affirm a.qreements 
without the consent of the Dominican Congress. Be waa, how­
ever, willing to temporarily acquiesce in the collection and 
disbursement of receivership fund. and consented to the 
1l7Kunro , op.ait., p. 309. 
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reorqaniza~ion of the Dominican Army if the Uni~.d States 
would allow other La~n American nations to provide officers 
to assist in the overhaul. Wasbington, however, realized 
the•• aqr••ments would be of a transitory nature and that 
a new treaty would have to be negotiated once Henriquez' 
government was accorded recognition. What the State Depart­
ment wanted was an wiron-cladw agreement that would permit 
the creation of a constabulary and would a.sure United 
Stat.s fiscal oontrol. Since Henriquez' propos.ls fell 
short of thia mark, tbey ware flatly refus.d. 
After prolonged consultations with his advisers, Hen­
riquez once more attempt.ed to reach a compromise in late 
August.. A treaty was proposed which would have 9i~n the 
United States complete control o¥ar the Republic's financ.s 
and would ha.. employed American Army officers under four­
year oon~acts to reorganize the Dominican army. ~he only 
point Henriquez stood fi~ on was that. Dominican officer. 
would continue to reoeive their appointments by the DominicaD 
President. AdJdral Pond, who had replaced Caperton in July, 
••e.. to have been impres.ed by the•• overture.,13S but 
the State Department remained intranai9ent and curtly refused 
further neqotiations. 
Barly in october, Russell wa. called to W.shinqton for 
a conference with Secretary Lan.inq to communioate his 
138Ibid., p. 310.
-
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recommendations on future policies. The American Minister 
was for the presenting of a final ultimatum which, if 
rejected, would mean that the United States would have to 
-take charge- of the nation's affairs. 139 Lansing apparentJ¥ 
agreed with Ru••ell, for an urgent plea from Henriquez that 
some solution be adopted which would not obliterate Domini­
can sovereignty went unnoticed. 140 
By November the State Department had lost all inter­
est in any further attempts at negotiation. Washington had 
concluded that a formal military occupation was the only 
remedy for the ills which plaqued the beleagored Republic. 
To a large degree it was influenced by the American occu­
pation of Haiti where full military control had resulted in 
the adoption of a treaty that contained all the provisions 
for reform that Washington wanted. There were, however, 
other equally important considerations aside from the Hai­
tian experience, which help explain Washington's decision 
to go ahead with a military occupation. 
One of the principal reasons for State Department 
intransigence oentered around the fact that the ultimate 
value of any agreement would depend on the attitude of the 
Dominican Congress and the President who would succeed Ben­
riquez when his five month term expired. Prospects for 
139aus8e11 to Lansing, September 25, 1916 quoted in 
Munro, op.cit., p. m 
140welles , op.cit., II, p. 790. 
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cooperation were anything but bright. When Henriquez was 
elected, Dominican politicians had reconvened the Consti­
tutional Convention elected in 1914, with a view toward 
reforming the Constitution. Prom the start there waa dis­
cord within the convention. To insure a quorum it was nec­
essary for sixteen members to meet, but day after day the 
Jimenistas refused to attend. The only business accomplilhed 
was the adjournment procedure. In the absence of consti­
tutional changes, the electoral colleges in several provin­
ces met of their own volition and returned the electors of 
1914, a majority of whom were Jimenistas. While this action 
was clearly illeqal, what bothered the State Department was 
the fact that moat of the members contemplated the election 
of Arias as President. The prospect that Arias might secure 
the Presidency was not contemplated with equanimity in Wash­
ington. Officials reqarded him as a political and military 
bully who had extorted money from the Dominican Government 
for over a quarter of a century. Aaide from his caudillo 
activities, he and many members of his party were outspokenly 
pro-German. 14l In the minds of many, a government headed 
by such a man presented a security risk in the Caribbean, 
this Washington would not permit• 
. For a time, the United States had profited by the 
qeneral friendliness eXhibited toward Americans. By Novem­
141 1Munro, op.cit., pp. 311- 3. 
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her the mood of the people had chanqed to one of open hos­
tility. During the month of September, American Marines had 
gradually assumed many of the roles traditionally assigned 
to the Dominican police force. Armed patrols begaD making 
arrests of Dominican citizens. By October Russell compli­
cated the situation further by ordering the arrest of sev­
eral caudillos who had sacked the customhouse at La Romana 
the summer before. In an attempt to seize one of these men, 
Ram6n Batista, a fight ensued which took the lives'·:of two 
Marine officers. Two days later, on October 26th, an encoun­
ter with a drunken qunman in the capital resulted in the 
deaths of aeveral innocent bystanders. American military 
personnel also attempted to impose a censorShip on the more 
radical Dominican dailies. Such actions, while well inten­
tioned on the military's part, understandably provoked the 
-, 
~~.t resentment on the part of many Dominicans. Hostil­
ity toward AmerioAns was also generated by the fact that fOr 
four months Washington had suspended all payments to the 
Dominican government. The suspension of salariea to govern­
mental agencies and employees had brought about an intoler­
able economic situation which had left many Dominicans des­
titute. 
By the middle of November, Secretary Lansing realized 
that the situation was fast approaohing a crisis. on Novem­
ber 14, Henriquez had requested that the electoral colleges 
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choose new .enators and deputies to replace those whose 
terms had expired. The State Department feared the elec­
tion of Arias after evaluation of the situation, and decided 
that immediate action was nece.sary. on November 22, 1916, 
Secretary Lansing expressed his fear of weconomic disaster­
and -impending revolutionw within the Republic, citingl 
• • • the fact that the Provisional Government 
will not meet the views of the United States in 
regard to ,the establishment of financial control 
and the constabulary, brings the Government of 
the United States face to face with a serious prob­
lem.. • • The wi thholdinq of the funds by the 
United States Government on account of the fact 
that recognition has not been qranted to Henriquez 
has broQqht an economic crisis in the country
which is daily growing worse and for which this 
Government would not wish to be placed in such a 
position that it would be held responsible•••• 
It is thought that the only solution of the dif­
ficulty would be the declaration of martial law 
and placing of Santo Domingo under military occu­
pation, basing this on the interpretation which 
the United States has given to the Dominican Con­
vention of 1907 and a180 upon the present unset­
tled conditions in the Republic • • • Captain Knapp 
~ • • is understood to have arrived today in Santo 
Dominqo and it is believed that no time should be 
lost in instructing him to put into effect the 
proclamation declaring military control and to 
commence immsdiateil2the disbursement of funds 
under martial law. 
When President Wilson replied to Lansing'. memorandum 
on November 26, 1916, his thoughts were elsewhere. As Sum­
ner Welles points out. 
The immense upheaval which had resulted from the 
outbreak of the World War, the constantly increaskg 
l42poreign Relations, 0E.cit., 1916, p. 241. 
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evidence that the United State. might not be per­
mitted to re..in aloof, and the activities of hi. 
own electoral campaign, had made it increasingly
difficult during the preceding year for President 
Wil.on to devote much attention to the Dominican 
situation. The successive step. which had been 
taken during the summer months, while duly reported 
to him, had doubtle.. not impreased them.elves upon 
hi. in their full gravity, since his mind had bJ43 
now become engrossed with the European problem. 
In approving the military occupation, Wilson did, how­
ever, strike from the proclamation the sentence which would 
have authorized the officer in charge to remove any Domini­
can judge conaidered unfit. Wilson'. reply to Secretary 
Lansing read aa follows. 
It is with the d••pest reluotance that I approve
and authorize the course here propo.ed, but I am 
convinced that it ia the lea.t of the evila in 
sight tn thi. very perplexing situation. I there­
fore authori.. you to i.sue the nece••ary instruc­
tion. in the pr..i •••• 
I have stricken out the sentence in the pro­
po.ea proclamation which authorized the commanding
officer to remove judg•• and other. in certain 
cirOWllBtano... It may be nece••ary to re.ort to 
.uch .xtre....asur•• , but I do not d••• it wi.e 
to put .0 arbiHtry an announce.nt in the prl'cla­
aatioD itself. 
Senriquez met with Captain B.S. Knapp, who had re­
placed Admiral Pond in November, in a tinal interview on 
November 28, 1916,but nothing was accompli.hed. Th. next 
day a military occupation was procla1aed, which in the word. of 
143..11e., op.cit., II, p. '92. 
l44roreign Relations, op.cit., 1916, p. 242. 
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Sumner Welles. 
• • • officially disregarded the existence of a 
Dominican Government established, in aocordance 
with the Dominican Constitution, by the Dominican 
people, in the exercise of the rights inherent in 
them as a aovereign nati9n, a nation which had main­
tained its liberty and independence against every 
menace and against overwhelmi~~ odds during the 
preceding seventy-two years. 
The official proclamation based the intervention on 
the Dominican government's violation of Article III of the 
1907 Convention. It was stated that the occnpation was 
undertaken ·with no immediate or ulterior object of destroy­
ing the sovereignty of the Republio· but rather was designed 
·to give aid to that country in returning to a condition of 
internal order that will enable it to observe the terms of 
the treaty aforesaid, and the obligationa resting upon it 
as one of the family of nations.·146 Almost a week later, 
the Dominioan Minister in Washington, Ar.mando P'rez Perdomo, 
filed an official protest. At the time, Perdomo's protest 
received little attention, but as the last official act of 
an occupied natio~ the words today carry a poignant me.sage. 
Be stated that. 
A state of war which alone could have justified
such a proceeding on the part of the Government of 
the United States toward the Dominican Republic
has never existed between the two Nations. 
And therefore by acting as it has with the Domin­
ican RepubliC, Your Excellency's Government plainly 
l45welles, op.cit., II, p. 793. 

146poreign Relations, op.cit., 1916, pp. 246-47. 
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violated in the first place, the fundamental prin­
ciples of public international law which laid down 
as an invariable rule of public order for the 
nations the reciprocal respect of the sovereignty
of eaoh and every one of the other states of the 
civilized world, and in the second place, the prin­
Ciples which guide the doctrine of Pan-Americanism 
which hallow the inviolability of American national­
ities, principles which may be said to have found 
their highest virtues in the many official declar­
ations ~'7the learned President of the United 
States. 
l47Dominican Minister Armando Perez Perdomo's protest 
delivered on December 4, 1916 is quoted in Walles, 0E.cit., 
II, p. 796. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
Drawn by the lucrative trade prospects of the Carib­
bean in the later part of the eighteenth century, the United 
States 800n found herself playing an active role in the 
affaira of Hispaniola durin9~he early years of the nine­
teenth century. United States involvement deepened with 
the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 when Wash­
ington committed herself to a policy deaigned to prevent 
European incursion into the Western Hemisphere. 
Bncouraged by Dominican politicians who feared Hai­
tian conquest, the United States flirted with the idea of 
annexation during the 1850·s. Civil War cut short the.e 
notiona, but the Spanish occupation, although a failure, 
aroused a greater determination on the part of Washington 
that the island Republic should never again be dominated by 
a Buropean power. This determination led to a policy of 
annexation by the Grant administration which favored United 
States expansion in the Caribbean. Congress, however, did 
not accept the arqument that expansion was necessary to pre­
vent European encroachment, and the proposals of Preaident 
Grant were defeated. 
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Althouqh expansionist projects were henceforth 
viewed with disfavor, Washington still insisted that Rure. 
pean powers be excluded fro. the caribbean. When DOlItinioan 
il'uSebt.ednes8 led to the threat of possible Buropean inter­
vention, Pre8ident Theodore Roosevelt moved swiftly to block 
any expansionist desips European powers m1ght have enter­
tained. With the promulgation of hi. Corollary to the Mon­
roe Doctr~ he wa. able to forestall any European advance 
in the Caribbean by establishing a austoma receivership 
whioh .atisfied foreign cred1to~. and maintained the Domini­
can Republic'. sovereignty. 
Roosevelt had hoped his policies would bring peace to 
the Dominican "publiC, but by 1912 it became evident that 
aucb hopes were not to be realized. Presideat Wilson ad­
hered to the established policy in regards to Buropean expeD­
aion in the caribbean but brOadened the role of the United 
State. in the domestic polici.s of the nominioan Republic 
by insiating on the establishment of a constitutional 
democracy, whioh in his llind was'.nec.s.ary to put an end to 
~l. endl••s cycle of revolution. If the Dominicans oould 
\ 	 but learn the ways of democracy, he r...one4, then the cha­
otic conditions which invited foreign encroachment would 
ceas. to exlat. When it became apparent that delIIOoracy 
v.a Dot so ••sily ia4uced, Wilson took the final a.p anel 
&ant United States Marin.s to oocupy the Republic and instruct 
,. 

the DoIa1Aica. in tlle .ays of -.ocracy. 
III _lUI, Onited St.at.e_ ia_i_tAmee t.hat. the DoJainican 
Republio aut ......r be 40aWlated by a Buropean power encour­
aged a variet.y of foreign policy decisions d.signed to 
acbieve this end. Depending on the ideolog-ical bent of the 
administration in power, the.e aecisions ranved from att.~ 
at outright annexation and financial control to a military 
occupation. 
A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
As the scope of this reading list ia ...11, the 
concerned student who wishes to explore facets of Domini­
can history other than the one presented in this thesis 
would do well to consult other bibliographical aids, the 
.,st i1BpOrt.ant of which are the following. Samuel F. Bellis 
and Grace Gardner Griffin, Guide to the Diplomatic Historx 
of the United States, 1775-1921 (Washington, 1935, re­
printed 1959), a saholarly compilation of staggering pro­
portions. H.B.B. Mayer, List of Referenc.s on the Monroe 
Doctrine (Washington, 1919) and Phillip Bradley, Bibliog­
raphy of the Monroe Doctrine, 1919-29 ~London, 1929) COD­
tain the more important materials Q~ to that time. Mater­
ials of more recent date may be obtained by consulting J.P. 
Harrison, Guide to Material. on Latin America in the .~­
tional Archives (Waahington, 1961). 
Useful bibliographical tools, other than those as­
sociated with foreign relationa, are R.A. Humphreys' Latin 
American Histort. A Guide to the Literature in Bn,lish 
(London, 1958), .specially u.eful to the student unacquain­
ted with Latin Aaerica, and the always beneficial Pan Amer­
ican Union's Index to Latin American .eriodical Literature, 
1929-1960 (Boston, 1962). 
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Tbe student wbo wishe. to peruse recently written 
material. on the Dominican Republic would do well to aon­
suit the Handbook of Latin American Studies (Cambridge and 
Gainesville, 1936-), Public Affairs Information Service 
(Mew York, 1915-), and the Reader's Guide to Periodical 
Literature (New York, 1900-). 
Dominican history ha. suffered neglect botb within 
it. borders and abroad. Censorsbip under a number of 
/dictators, ranging from Bae. to Trujillo, has reduced the 
number of worthwbile Dominican studies to a trickle, wbile 
••terials written abroad by exiles are almeat tapessible 
to obtain. By far, the best history in Englisb of the 
Dominican Republic covering the pre-Trujillo period is 
Samner Welle.' Naboth' a Vineyard I Tbe Dominican Republic, 
1844-1924 (2 vol., New rork, 1928). Written by • justly 
f.-au. diplomat, it contain. much material obtained from 
Dominican writers .s well .a fro. the archives of the State 
Department of the United States. A sympathetic view of 
Dominican history i. pre.entad by Otto Schoenrich, Santo 
Domingo. .. eountry With a Future (New fork, 1918). Read­
able surveys whicb include ..tarial on Trujillo are Selden 
Rodman, QuisreXa, a Hi.tory of the Dominican Republic 
(Seattle, 1964), Rayford W. Logan, Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic (New York, 1968), and John Bdwin Paqq, CUba, Baiti, 
and the Dominican Republic (Enqlewood Cliffs, 1965). 
101 
Mary Treudley, The United Stat.s and Santo Domingg, 
1789-1866 (Worcester, 1916, reprinted from Journal of Race 
Development, VI, July and October 1916, pp. 83-145, 220-74), 
Charles Callan Tan.ill, The United States and Santo Domingo, 
1798-1873, a Chapter in Caribbean Diplomaet (Baltimore, 193., 
and C.C. Hauch, -Attitudes of Porei9n Governments towarda 
the Spanish Reocoupation of the Dominican Republic,- Bia­
-
panic Amerioan Hi~torical Review, XXVII (1947), pp. 247-68, 
are the m.jor studiea in nineteenth century Dominican dip­
lomatic history. Rayford W. Logan, The Diplomatic Relationa 
of the United States with Baiti, 1776-1891 (Chapel Bill, 
North Carolina, 1941), L.L. Montague, Haiti and the United 
States, 1714-1938 (Durham, North carolina, 1940), and C.L.R. 
Jame8, The Black Jacobina. Toussaint L' OUverture and the 
San Domingo Revolution (Hew York, 1963) are valuable for 
the period before 1844. 
Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in 
the Caribbean 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964) ia a .uperior 
analysis of early twentieth century Dominican-United Stat.s 
relationa. Its value is enhanced by the fact that Munro 
was given aoa••• to state Department files. Studies which 
rely in larg~ part on printed material such a8 welles' 
"olu. and PoraiS!! Relations are Grab.. B. Stuart, Latin 
America and ~e United States (New York~ 1943), Wilfrid 
Hardy Callcott, The Caribbean poliSX of the United State., 
102 

1890-1920 (Baltimore, 1942), and Chester Lloyd Jones, The 
Caribbean Sinoe 1900 (New York, 1936). 
Valuable summaries of United State. foreign polioy 
in the Caribbean may be obtained by consulting J. Lloyd 
Macham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations 
(New York, 1965) and J. Fred Rippy, Tbe Caribbean D&n9!r 
lone (New fork, 1940). In connection with United States 
~
use of the Monroe Doctrine the reader should not overlook 
the volume hy Dexter Perkins entitled A Histo£X of the Mon­
roe Doctrine (Boston, 1955). 
PUndamental SOurces used in the preparation of this 
theais include Paeers Rel.tinS to Foreij2 Relations of the 
United States, with the annual ..ssage of the 'resident to 
Congr••s, generally known as Porei9n Relation~ (Washington, 
1862-) and James D. Richardson's A Compilation of the Mea­
~ag.s and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (20 vola, New 
York, 1917). Ulysses S. Grant in his Personal Memoirs 
of Ul18••• S. Grant (2 vols, New York, 1885) details his 
plana for the Dominican RepubliC, while Joseph Bucklin 
Bishop,in the volume. entitled Theodore Roo.evelt and Hia 
Time Shown in His Own Lettera (2 vola, Rew York, 1920), dem­
onstratea Rooaevelt's anti-annexationist attitude.. Prob­
ably the best study of Boosevelt'. action. in the Caribbean 
during his pre.ideney is contaiDed in Boward C. Bill, Roose­
velt and the Caribbean (Chicago, 1927). Studiea relating 
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to the establishment of a customs receivership include 
eeveral article. by Jacob H. Hollander, the moat important 
of whicb ia -The Readjustment of San Domingo's Financee,· 
guarterly Journal of Economics, XXI (May, 1907), pp. 405-26. 
J. Pred Rippy discus.es Roosevelt's action in the Dominican 
Republic in -The Initiation of the CUstoms Receivership in 
the Dominican Republic,· Hiaeanic American Historioal Re~, 
XVII (1937), pp. 419-57. 
Studi.. of the military occupation may be obtained 
by r.ading Carl Kel.ey, ~he American Intervention in Haiti 
and the Dominican Reeublic (Philadelpbia, 1922, reprinted 
from Annal. of the American Acadeex of Political and Social 
Science, 100, March, 1922, pp. 109-200) and Melvin M. Knight, 
The Apericane in santo Domingo (New fork, 1928),which is 
highly critical of Unit:ed St.at.s policy. An i_n•• aJIOunt 
of valuable data concerning the occupation is to be found 
in a Senate report entitled Hearinis on Haiti ~d Santo 
Domingo.J2 vola, 67th Congr••s, Fir.t and Second ••••ion., 
Washington, 1922). 
